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1 Introduction
Behavioural approach has o¤ered new tools for consumption-saving economics to solve and explain
some of the puzzles faced with conventional models. By using behavioural models some interesting
and plausible solutions can be provided e.g. to undersaving, and overuse of credit cards. In this
paper, we continue on this path of consumption-saving analysis by exploring existence impacts of
a retirement savings program on di¤erent kinds of hyperbolic agents.
Börsch-Supan and Brugiavini (2001) list four developments why savings in general will be in-
uenced forcefully in Europe: population ageing, increasing mobility, changing societys view about
the role of the state in providing social security, and nally new nancial landscape in Europe.
They also state among others that one of the most important, if not the most important, inter-
action between savings and policy is centered on pensions. In a vast part of Europe large masses
of employees are in the phase of transition from an employee to a pensioner. So far, quite many
European countries have had pension funding as a part of their social security system, called usually
as pay-as-you-go pension system. The system works in general so that people who are currently
in the workforce provide pension for those who are retired. Recent analyses have shown that the
mass which is to be in the retiring phase in few years is intolerable to the current, social security
based, system.1 It has been clearly stated in the public debate that a pension reform is required to
accommodate new challenges in the nancial environment of pension funding. There are basically
three di¤erent suggested ways to route the current pension system. Firstly, complete dissolution of
the public pension system by replacing it with a privately funded pension system. Secondly, partial
dissolution of the public pension system while increasing workersresponsibility of pension funding
by an amount it is reduced by the dissolution. Thirdly, saving in advance to cover the increas-
ing future costs of the public pension system, i.e. increasing current payroll taxation. Intriguing
question springs then up: what are the e¤ects of the chosen pension funding method on individual
saving behaviour.
This paper concentrates on the rst of the given solution concepts. According to that pension
funding would be arranged so that rms govern their workerspension savings as it is currently the
case in the United States.2 Similarly, private funding could, of course, be just a part of individual
1For a very thorough analysis about current state in EU see e.g. Holzmann et al. (eds.) (2003).
2Retirement saving programs (or plans) are popularly known by the sections of tax code that address di¤erent kinds
of employers: colleges and non-prots generally o¤er 403(b) plans, while private companies usually o¤er 401(k)s, and
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saving as the administratively lightest option would suggest. In this paper we do not distinguish
between instances that provide a savings program but we rather contrast a lucrative savings program
with regular, checking account, saving. Lucrativety is provided by a higher interest rate in savings
program than paid on checking account saving. The savings program and checking account are
considered only possible options for an individual to save for his own pension in our set up where the
public pension system is terminated. Our study compares individual consumption-saving behavior
in two cases: (1) in the absence and (2) in the presence of a retirement savings program. We
concentrate on possible consequences of hyperbolic behaviour on retirement savings when the public
pension system is replaced completely with private saving. Our particular interest is on negative
existence e¤ects of a retirement savings program. We take ex-post-transition perspective, and hence
we do not speak out how the overlapping phase between the old and the new pension system should
be arranged.
We depart from the conventional consumption-saving analysis by assuming hyperbolic intertem-
poral preferences instead of (conventional) exponential preferences. This causes that the agents
action plans can be time inconsistent, i.e. the agent su¤ers from a self-control problem (SCP) à la
ODonoghue and Rabin (1999c).3 Our main argument for using hyperbolic preferences is that a
large body of evidence has shown that those t the best in the data when completion of a task is
studied. Several empirical studies have shown that people are eager to preproperate pleasant tasks
and keen to procrastinate onerous tasks. Completion of a task, e.g. revising an article or enrolling
on a retirement savings program requires e¤ort that is costly in terms of utility but not usually in
money. So far, the conventional models have been quite much incapable of sorting out the reasons
for procrastination behaviour while hyperbolic models do well in explaining behaviour that is hard
to explain plausibly with the conventional models.4 In a pure consumption-saving set up, number
of recent behavioral economics studies have shown that a model with hyperbolic preferences ts
governmental groups provide 457(b)s; there are other plans called 401(a)s and qualied plans that work in generally
the same way. Note also IRAs, that are, from their part, tax-advantaged Individual Retirement Accounts.
3 In general, hyperbolic preferences are such that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption at two
future dates depends on the date at which evaluated. Strotz (1955-56) established that planned actions in an
discrete intertemporal choice problem are time-inconsistent if and only if discounting is non-exponential and there is
no commitment device available. Phelps and Pollak (1968), and Pollak (1968) continued developing Strotz (1955-56)
work and build up the framework for non-exponential discounting and self-control problems. Then, Laibson (1994,
1996, 1997), Laibson et al. (1998) and Harris and Laibson (2001) formulated a solid theory eld to study and
apply the assumption of hyperbolic preferences in a consumption-savings analysis with multiselves approach. Micro-
oriented studies from similar starting points were then presented in ODonoghue and Rabin (1999a, b, c, 2001a, b,
forthcoming).
4See e.g. Ainslie (1992), Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), and Frederic et al. (2002).
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better also to consumption-saving data than exponential preferences do.5 For example, a detected
drop in consumption around the retirement was hard to explain with traditional life cycle models
while use of a hyperbolic consumption-saving model gave a relief and solved this problematic issue
with a plausible explanation. Hence, we lean on empirical and experimental data showing and
reinforcing the matter that hyperbolic preferences do describe better an individual intertemporal
decision process than what exponential preferences appear to do.
Our consumption-saving modeling follows strongly the lines of Laibson (1996) whereas the fash-
ion of procrastination and agents types are captured less intensively from ODonoghue and Rabin
(1999c, 2001b, forthcoming). However, our model is a stripped-down version of their models in
some dimensions. Our model is simplied to gain a good tractability and a strong emphasis on
the most important results. The time frame, on the other hand, is nite instead of innite. With
this choice we try to adopt a bit more realistic picture of individual retirement saving behaviour.
This causes many concepts to be non-stationary, and hence structures and conditions become more
complex than e.g. ODonoghue and Rabin (2001b) have in their innite time-frame model. The
most easily seen di¤erence deals with threshold values that ODonoghue and Rabin (2001b) get for
the agents decision rules. For an innite time frame, these thresholds do not vary in the passage
of time. Contrary, in our setting such constant threshold values are absent due to the existence
of terminal period. We simplify the model also by choosing not to have uncertainty. Further, the
agents only tasks are to make an intertemporal consumption-saving plan in every period, and if
possible, also to choose whether or not and when (if ever) to start a lucrative retirement savings
program. As assumed for most of savings program models, also in our model, enrolling on the
savings program is assumed to be costly in terms of utility.6
Procrastination is possible when the savings program is present. Our procrastination analysis
relates to ODonoghue and Rabin (1999c) where a trasfer of a xed size capital stock from one
account to a better paid account is studied. However, in their model consumption behaviour is not
contemplated at all as the agent does not have any possibilities to consume the capital stock or other
wealth. The sole task for the agent is to transfer the capital stock from one to another account. We,
instead, consider here a slightly di¤erent case where the agent has to make simultaneous decisions
5See e.g. Laibson et al. (1998)
6For reasoning and justication see e.g. Madrian and Shea (2001) and the preliminary work of Choi et al. (2004)
that provide empirical studies about 401(k) retirement savings program and enrollment on it.
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about optimal consumption and when to complete the task of starting a lucrative retirement savings
program. Naturally, these two tasks are connected resulting in certain e¤ects on each other. Our
contribution springs up from a time-varying budget constraint causing non-stationary motives to
start, and procrastinate starting of, the savings program. For the motives to procrastinate, exibility
in current budget constraint is important as well.
The results establish that depending on the agents type, that are naive, sophisticated and learn-
ing naive, consumption-saving plans are consistent with realising actions only for the sophisticated
agent while inconsistent for the two other types. The seminal result from Pollak (1968) stating that
in the absence of a commitment device the realising actions for all the types of the agent, namely
naive and sophisticated, with a logarithmic instantaneous utility function are the same, holds also
in our model, and it extends to hold for the learning naive agent too. More fascinating and novel
results are provided when the retirement savings program, SP from herein, is present. We nd
that if starting of SP is worthwhile, i.e. it is utility increasing even after su¤ering a non-monetary
utility cost to enroll on it, the naive agents retirement savings can be greater in the absence of SP
than in the presence of it. The sophisticated agent gains while the learning naive agent can gain
or su¤er from the existence of SP in the terms of retirement savings. Whether the learning naive
agent gains or su¤ers from the existence depends on the level of the e¤ort cost. These results give
us a possibility to discuss about optimal policy that should be exercised, and also about caveats
of certain policies, if a planned pension reform would be a complete substitution of the publicly
funded pension with private saving. Relating our results with the results from current literature
gives then policy suggestions which establish that if enrollment in SP incurs utility cost, this utility
cost should be decreased close to zero with non-automatic enrollment so that procrastination is not
tempting. When lowering the e¤ort cost is expensive relative to the cost of increasing individuals
capability to learn about self-control problems, the public authority should invest in and emphasise
the learning possibilities. Otherwise, an automatic enrollment on SP with optimised default should
be used. Further more and intuitively, since very existence of SP can make the naive and learning
naive worse o¤ in terms of retirement time savings, it is also possible that the publicly nanced
system with some minor changes results in, after all, the best outcome. That is, if the publicly
nanced retirement system provided originally more than the savings program yields for the soph-
isticated agents, the publicly nanced system could be maintained by decreasing the replacement
rate on the respective of the sophisticated agents ability to save along SP and all the types should
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accepted it.
The rest of the paper is constructed as follows. In Section 2 we present the basic set up, while
in Section 3 we analyse consumption and saving behaviour in the absence of SP. In Section 4 we
incorporate the savings program into the analysis, and in Section 5 we solve numerically some
results to give support for formal analysis. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Basic Set Up
This section introduces rst our basic set up in which modeling of consumption-saving follows
strongly the lines of Laibson (1996). We also give a formal denition for di¤erent agent types
in terms of agents awareness about his future SCPs. The verbal counterpart of our formal type
classication relates to ODonoghue and Rabin (1999c, 2001b, forthcoming). The basic set up as
a whole is thus a modication of the models established in Laibson (1996) and ODonoghue and
Rabin (1999c, 2001b, forthcoming). After releasing the basic set up with necessary tools we exploit
it to contemplate consumption-saving behaviour of the di¤erent agent types. Finally, consumption-
saving behaviour is compared between the di¤erent types and across separate selves of the agent.
From now on we suppress notation by denoting any subsequence fn; n + 1; :::;Kg of natural
numbers, N, by NKn ; and whenever n = 1; i.e. for NK1 = f1; 2; :::;Kg; we use NK1  NK : For other
notational ease we omit, whenever it is possible, those super and subscripts that are obvious and
clear from the context, or redundant for the analysis.
Time is discrete and nite, it runs from period t = 1 to period T , hence t 2 NT for all t. We
use the multiselves approach, and thus we model the agent as a sequence of autonomous temporal
selves.7 These selves are indexed by the respective periods in which they control the choice variable,
hence the set of selves is NT and we denote a self at period t by self(t). For all i and for all
t 2 NT 1, agents intertemporal preferences are assumed to be hyperbolic and we present them
7We say that discounting is quasi-hyperbolic since discounting is exponential for all periods from t + 1 onwards
and captures only the key qualitative property of hyperbolic discount function, i.e. a faster rate of decline in the
short run than in the long run. From now on we always refer to quasi-hyperbolic discounting with the term hyperbolic
discounting.
In the multiselves model agents identity is cut in as many selves as there are periods in the model, i.e. periods
that the agent lives. Then, the present self plays an extensive form game with his future selves with a strategy that
depends on agents type.
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with the following modication of the model proposed in Phelps and Pollak (1968).
U it  u(ct) + (t;i)
T tP
=1
u(ct+ ); (1)
where Ut is the agents time-additive intertemporal utility at time t 2 NT 1 that consists of the time-
separable, continuous and strictly concave instantaneous utility functions, u(ct), and consumptions,
ct, and naturally, UT = u (cT ) : The discount parameters are 0 <  < 1 and 0 <  < 1; and have
the following interpretations:  is the short term, sometimes called as a time-inconsistent, discount
factor whereas  is conventional long term exponential discount factor. The instantaneous utility
function u(ct) is assumed to be in the class of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). Its general
representation is thus u(ct) =
(ct)
1  1
1  , for which  > 0 ( < 0) implies that the agent is risk
averse (risk lover). In the analysis we x  = 1, and hence we use the explicit form of u(ct) = ln ct.8
In Def.(1) we have reserved the possibility of having di¤erent s for di¤erent selves and for the
di¤erent agent types. That is (t;i) denotes  for self(t) of type i. We then say that the smaller
(the bigger) the time-inconsistent discount factor  is the bigger (the smaller) agents SCP is.
We have three di¤erent agent types: the naive agent (NA), the learning naive agent (LN ), and
the sophisticate agent (SA), hence 8i holds i 2 I  fNA;LN; SAg. The agent is naive when
he anticipates that his preferences do not change in time, i.e. he is not aware neither does he
know about his future preferences reversals.9 The agent is sophisticated when he knows his future
preferences. The agent is learning naive when, after the rst period, the agent is aware about his
self-control problem but underestimates the magnitude while this failure gets smaller as he learns
his preferences along the passage of time. Formally, we dene.10
Denition 1 Let (t)(t+j) denote self(t)s perceptions about t+j, and let the true state be such that
t+j = t =  < 18t 2 NT and 8 j 2 NT t. Then
a) the agent is naive i¤ (t)(t+j) = 1 8t 2 NT 2;8j 2 NT t;
b) the agent is learning naive i¤ (1)(1+j) = 1 8j 2 NT 1 and  < (t+1)(t+j+1) < (t)(t+j) < 1 8t 2
8 It is easy to verify for u(ct) =
(ct)
1  1
1  that it is continuous in almost everywhere, i.e. it is continuous
everywhere except at  = 1, for which we get as a special case u(ct) = ln ct. Then u0(ct) > 0, u00(ct) < 0 for all
ct > 0 and for all  > 0, and hence it is strictly concave and it fullls the property of diminishing marginal utility.
Due to the absence of uncertainty and non-trivial borrowing constraints in our model, a non-linear utility function
enables us to have also other than corner solutions.
9For a generic individual we use noun "he". The choice was made by tossing a fair coin.
10The reasoning and deduction of the denition is consigned to Appendix A.
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NT 22 ;8j 2 NT t;
c) the agent is sophisticated i¤ (t)(t+j) =  8t 2 NT 2;8j 2 NT t.
We assume 0 < (t;i) < 1 and  = (t;i) for all (t; i) 2 NT 1I, and with out loss of generality
we set (T;i) = 0 for all i since the terminal self does not have relevant intertemporal preferences:
The agent starts working in period 1 with a certain and constant periodical disposable salary
of wt.11 The agent knows that he will retire in period P + 1 and that he is forced to save for his
own pension as there are no incomes during the pension. This is to say that wt = w > 0 if t 2 NP
and wt = 0 if t 2 NTP+1:
The agents sole every period problem is to maximise his intertemporal utility U it by choosing
consumption (and hence saving) subject to his budget constraint. To complete the task, the agent
makes a consumption-saving plan over the remaining periods that maximises his intertemporal
utility. To keep the analysis simple we do not set any non-trivial borrowing constraints for the
agent.12 This implies that the agents liquidity constraint is always the sum of present value of the
agents labour income and current nancial wealth. Hence, the agent makes his consumption-saving
choices subject to the budget constraint that can be dened recursively as follows.
ct Wt  (Wt 1   ct 1)R;
where net wealth Wt includes the discounted present value of the stream of labor income added to
the sum of current nancial wealth, i.e.
Wt = Rst + w
P tX
=0
 ;
and where R is the constant gross return on wealth with the interest rate r, i.e. R = 1+r. Notably,
the interest rate on both, saving and borrowing, is r: About the long-term discount factor  we
assume for simplicity that it is the inverse of the gross interest rate  = R 1. The agent does
not have initial savings and we assume that he does not leave any bequest, formally this means
W1 = w
PP 1
=0 
 and WT   cT = 0.
11We call wt as disposable salary, since it is considered as net-of-tax salary.
12With a non-trivial borrowing constraint we refer to the constraint that would be lower than the agents current
wealth.
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To derive the optimal consumption-saving plan, self(t) of type i has to solve the following
intertemporal utility maximising problem.
max
fcjgT tj=t
U it
s:t:
T tX
=0
 c+t Wt:
The set up is nite in time, and the agent is assumed to be able to conduct backwards induction
for the maximisation problem. Consequently, the solution will be a subgame perfect equilibrium
from the viewpoint of the self who does the maximisation in his turn.13
Finally and before turning to analyse consumption-saving behaviour, we still present some useful
concepts and notation. We let Cti  fct;it+jgT tj=0 denote a sequence of planned consumption choices
of self(t) of the type i, whereas Cti  fcit+jgT tj=0 denotes a sequence of realised consumption choices
from the period t onwards. We denote Cti = C
t
i if and only if c
t;i
t+j = c
i
t+j for all j 2 NT t otherwise
Cti 6= Cti .
Saving resolves then as a residual to consumption, and hence what is not consumed is saved. Let
sit+1 denote a realised saving from period t to period t+1 in terms of the valuation of period t. Thus,
we let Sti  fst;it+jgT tj=0 denote a sequence of self(t)s planned periodical saving and respectively
Sti  fsit+jgT tj=0 denotes a sequence of realised saving. Again, we denote Sti = Sti if and only if
st;it+j = s
i
t+j for all j 2 NT t and Sti 6= Sti otherwise:Realised temporal saving during the working
periods is clearly w ct+Rst  st+1 and during the retirement time it is Rst ct =Wt ct  st+1.
From the assumption of only trivial borrowing constraints follows that st may be negative or
positive during the working periods. Particularly, self(t) is a debtor whenever st < 0 or st+1 < 0
or both holds. Clearly, self(t) borrows always if his consumption exceeds his current savings, i.e. if
ct   w > 0 and ct   w > Rst. There are then two possible cases when self(t) borrows: 1) self(t)
consumes more than earns and has insu¢ cient non-negative savings, i.e. ct w > Rst  0; 2) self(t)
13Whether or not the solution will be subgame perfect equilibrium also from other selves viewpoint depends
completely on each selfs correctness of perceptions about other selves behaviour. Naturally, when these perceptions
are incorrect it might happen that even though some self(t) considers his choice as a part of subgame perfect
equilibrium, due to fallacious perceptions future selves do not behave as he thought and he might have chosen
di¤erently if he had known the true behaviour.
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consumes more than earns and his current savings are non-positive, i.e. ct   w > 0  Rst.14 ,15
3 Consumption and saving behaviour
3.1 Consumption
Next proposition reveals us both the realising consumption choices and the consumption plan of
each type and self.
Proposition 1 Given the basic set up,
(i) for any i 2 I, and any t 2 NT 1, the realised consumption path is
Cti = fjWjgTj=t ;
where Wj = Rsj + wj
PP j
=0 
 ; and j =

1 + 
PT j
=1 

 1
j 2 NT :
ii) the relation between a realising consumption path Cti and a plan C
t
i of type i of self(t) is
CtNA = ftWt; tWt; tWt; :::; tWt| {z }
T t elements
g 6= CtNA for any t 2 NT 2;
CtLN =

tWt;


(t)
(j)W
t
j
T
j=t+1

6= CtLN ;
CtSA = fjWjgTj=t = CtSA:
Proof. All proofs are consigned to Appendix B.
The claim (i) in Proposition (1) gives the realised consumption path. We nd that the agent
consumes in every period a certain fraction of his wealth and this fraction is selfs time-dependent
marginal propensity to consume which is linear in current wealth. Moreover, the realising consump-
tion path is independent of agents type, which is a consequence to our choice of the logarithmic
instantaneous utility function.16 The claim (i) in Proposition (1) has some useful properties. Firstly,
14Later on, we will show that in the basic set up and for the all agent types only the second possibility occurs but
never the rst one.
15Note that we count the repayment of a loan in the category of positive saving, and hence we consider self(t) is
saving also in the case where the savings are still negative but increasing, i.e. st+1  0 and w   ct > 0.
16This result was rst established and proved in Pollak (1968). In the mentioned paper a theorem states that "...in
the N decision point case, if the instantaneous utility function is logarithmic, then the naive optimum path and the
sophisticated optimum path coincides."
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since the realising consumption choice is independent of the agent type, we immediately know that
also the realising saving decisions must be independent of the type. Secondly, consumption-saving
plan comparisons across the agent types become comfortable and easy, since we know that wealth,
consumption and saving in a planning period are the same regardless of the agents type. From
the claim (ii) we see that planned consumption coincides with realising consumption only for SA
while NA and LN systematically makes an error with their consumption plans. We nd that every
self of NA consumes more during the planning period than what he plans to consume during the
subsequent periods, and that the planned consumption is constant in terms of the current valu-
ation for the subsequent periods.17 LN makes a similar mistake with NA when planning but his
planning error decreases in time due to ability to learn from his past behaviour.18 Only SAs every
self(t) knows that future selves are not going to honor his current preferences, and thus makes his
consumption plan conditionally on correctly anticipated future behaviour.
Before starting with the saving analysis we present one lemma that will alleviate it. Until
now, we know that the sequence of realised consumption of any type of the agent is of the form
Ct = ftWtgTj=t: However, we do not know whether the path of consumption is monotonic or not.
Even though we know that Wt > Wt+1 8t 2 NT 1; and hence, wealth decreases monotonically in
time, sign fct   ct+1g remains unknown, since at the same time t =

1 + 
PT t
=1 

 1
increases
monotonically in time, i.e. t < t+1 8t 2 NT 1. So, in principle it could happen that wealth
decreased proportionally less than t increased resulting in increasing consumption path, or vice
versa, or both at di¤erent times. To this end, the following lemma solves this problem by stating
that realised consumption decreases monotonically in time, i.e. ct > ct+1 8t 2 NT 1.
Lemma 1 Given the basic set up, ct > ct+1 8t 2 NT 1:
17Self(t)s consumption plan for periods t + j 2 NT t has straight forward analogy to exponentially discounting
agents plan. It is commonly known that when condition  = R 1 holds with intertemporal preferences, where
instantaneous utility function is logarithmic the optimal consumption is given by ct = ct+j 8j 2 NT t: Now, since
NA considers that he will behave as an exponential discounter in the future periods his plan for those periods is
given by the same rule that an exponential discounter would use.
18Of course, self(t) of any type would prefer the case where the later selves honored self(t)s preferences to the case
where every self(t+ j) maximises his own intertemporal preferences. To attain the consumption choices that would
follow self(t)s intertemporal preferences is now, however, impossible because of the absence of commitment devices.
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3.2 Saving
Recalling that we dened saving as a residual of consumption enables us to derive saving beha-
viour for the di¤erent agent types by using our results from the previous analysis, namely using
Proposition (1). We are primarily interested in agents saving for the retirement, i.e. sP+1 =
R 1W (P + 1) : Among lifetime saving behaviour the next proposition species also di¤erences and
similarities of planned and realised retirement savings between the di¤erent agent types.
Proposition 2 Given the basic set up,
i) Sti = S
t
j for all i; j 2 I, and for all t 2 NT ;
ii) Sti 6= Stj for all i; j 2 I such that i 6= j , and for all t 6= 1; t < T   1;
iii) st;iP+1 6= st;jP+1  sP+1 for all i; j 2 I such that i 6= j; and for all t 6= 1; t < P;
iv) st;LNP+1  st;NAP+1 ; for all t  P where st;iP+1 = st;iP+1   sP+1 for i 2 fNA;LNg:
The claim (i) in Proposition (2) follows directly from the claim (i) in Proposition (1). Since the
agents realising consumption is independent of the agent type and it is the same across the types, it
must be the case that also the sequences of realising saving choices are identical across the di¤erent
agent types. According to the claim (ii) the saving plans are all di¤erent between the di¤erent agent
types. Particularly, the claim (iii) states that the agents plans about total retirement savings are
di¤erent between the di¤erent agent types. Furthermore, by using the analysis behind the claims
(i) and (ii) with the claim (iii) we get to know that the plans about total retirement savings fail
to hold for NA and LN whereas SA knows perfectly his funds for the pension. Contrary to SAs
perfect knowledge, LNs and NAs self(t < P ) projects the plans about retirement savings higher
than what those ever will be. LN, however, learns that his preferences are subject to change in
the future periods, and hence his plans about the retirement savings approach SAs plan. NAs
plans approach to the actual amount of retirement savings also but convergence is solely caused by
decreasing wealth.
Let us now consider agents borrowing behaviour. Like it was stated earlier borrowing can
emerge, in principle, in the two di¤erent cases where in both consumption must exceed the wage:
1) the agent does not have any current positive savings, i.e. Rst  0 < ct   w; 2) the agent
has insu¢ cient positive savings to cover the wage exceeding consumption, i.e. 0 < Rst < ct   w.
The next proposition facilitates our the analysis by cancelling out the latter state of the emerging
borrowing possibilities. In other words, Proposition (3) establishes that given the basic set up the
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agent never consumes more than his current positive savings is. The proposition is presented in
more general form, and it actually states that if the agent starts to accumulate funds during the
working periods, he accumulates funds from that period onwards until the retirement, and hence
does not borrow ever again. The proposition states also that the agent borrows money in every
period before the rst period of positive saving.
Proposition 3 Given the basic set up,
i) If st+1 > Rst for some t < P then w   ct+j > 0 8j 2 NP t;
ii) If t = minfk  P jsk+1  Rsk g then st j  0 and w   ct j < 0 8j 2 Nt 1:
By Proposition (3) we know now that it never happens that the agent rst accumulated funds
and then would consume more than his positive savings is, i.e. it is not possible that Rst > 0 and
w   ct +Rst < 0:
In the next section we turn to a context where the agent is able to start a xed-contribution
retirement savings program, and hence in principle a weak commitment device is introduced into
the analysis. We will see that then the sophisticates and the learning naives start to gain from their
knowledge.
4 Saving Program and Procrastination
We now introduce a retirement savings program into the analysis. To get started, let us assume the
basic set up, and let us expand it by assuming that instead of having possibility to regular saving,
i.e. saving in the fashion of previous sections, the agent has also a possibility to make a costly e¤ort
to nd a supplier of a xed-contribution retirement savings program (SP) that guarantees him the
retirement savings of Bl if the program is started in period l.19 In other words, we assume that the
agent knows, 8i 2 I , that by making the costly e¤ort he can ensure retirement savings of size Bl
by saving a xed-contribution, ; along SP started in period l. Notation Btl then denotes (i) SP
that is available to self(t), and (ii) its size in the terms of money in the rst pension period, P +1;
if the program were started in period l.
Within this framework our interest is then to nd out how long the agent of the type i possibly
procrastinates until he makes the e¤ort to start the retirement savings program. Our other interest
19A costly e¤ort could just simply mean, for example, going to a bank and enroll on SP, where the cost is the harm
the agent feels when he has to quit watching a football match from the televison.
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is to nd out how planned and realised retirement savings then di¤er across selves. Finally, we are
interested in contemplating di¤erences in agents behaviour in the presence and absence of SP.
4.1 Revising the basic set up
E¤ort cost, utility, and budget constraint We assume that making the e¤ort is costly, and
that the e¤ort cost is an immediate non-monetary one-shot cost. Its e¤ect is assumed to be negative
on the total utility and it has the size of u(e) in terms of the instantaneous utility. The e¤ort cost
e is, thus, a money-metric measure that enables us to measure, in terms of the utility, a harm that
the agent feels when completing the task of starting SP.20 We also assume that the e¤ect of the
e¤ort cost is additively separable in the agents intertemporal utility function. Hence, if the agent
made the e¤ort, let us say, in period t = 2; the utility that self(2) would get in that particular
period would be then the instantaneous utility from the consumption subtracted by the disutility
from making the e¤ort, i.e.
u(c2)  u(e);
and the corresponding intertemporal utility from the viewpoint of self(1) would be then given as
U1 = u(c1) +  (u(c2)  u(e)) + 2u(c3) +   + T 1u(cT ).
Let l denote the period when the agent makes the e¤ort. Since l is unknown we modify the denition
of the intertemporal utility function given in Eq.(1) as follows.
Ut = u(ct)  ktu(e) + 
T tX
=1
 (u(c+t)  k+tu(e)) ;
where
kt =
8<: 0; if t 6= l1; if t = l :
Then, by making the e¤ort in period l self(l) commits himself and tries to commit all his subsequent
selves to contribute the xed SP contribution  in every period from period l onwards until to the
20 It is important to remark that due to our denition of the e¤ort cost, it will not show up in the budget constraint
but only in the intertemporal utility function.
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terminal working period P . If all selves from l to P contributes on SP, the agents intertemporal
budget constraint for self(t) can be written as follows.
ct +
T tX
=1
+1ct+  Rst +
P tX
=0
 (w   d+t) + P+1 tBl WBlt ; (2)
where
dn =
8<: 0; if n < l  P1; if n  l
and WBlt denotes a considered wealth in period t if SP were started in period l: Notice that we
use the term considered wealth, since self(t) considers that he will start SP in period l, and thus
if self(t) is condent about starting SP in the considered period he naturally includes this part of
increased wealth in his budget constraint when forming a consumption-saving plan.
Feasibility and cover It is trivial that the agent would not be interested in SP if it caused
a loss in his life time budget. Hence, for any SP to be feasible it is necessary that starting the
program will not cause a loss in the agents total budget. Naturally, feasibility is guaranteed for
any savings program for which RB = (1 + rB) > R = (1 + r), where rB is the interest rate paid
along the program and r is the interest paid on the regular savings. From now on, we assume that
the available savings program is of the form
Btl  
P tX
=l t
RP  t+1B ; (3)
where RB = 1 + rB > 1 + r = R, and hence rB > r. Setting Btl = 
PP t
=l tR
P  t+1
B cancels out
other bonuses that a bank could pay for the agent who starts SP. The agent only receives better
than the regular interest rate paid on the contributions  in SP.21
We say that SP has l-cover if SP that is started in period l guarantees the retirement savings
greater than or equal to the retirement savings self(l) of the type i anticipates being able to save
21We remark here that any feasible saving program is such that when it is started in period l; later selves will not
have an incentive to exit the program. This property and its reasoning will be discussed more carefully later on.
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without the savings program. Hence, SP has t-cover whenever the Eq.(4) below is satised.
Btt  
P tX
=0
RP  t+1B  Rst;iP+1: (4)
By elaborating Eq.(4) we get the lower bound for the contribution  that satises the property of
t-cover for any given and xed rB > r, i.e.
  Rs
t;i
P+1PP t
=0 R
P  t+1
B
:
In other words, the property of t-cover xes the lower bound of the contribution to a certain level
for any given interest rates r and rB for which rB > r.22 We will from now on assume that the
available savings program is of the form 1-cover for NA, and hence for given r and rB for which
rB > r we set  as follows23
  Rs
1;NA
P+1PP 1
=0 R
P 
B
: (5)
We make the assumption 1 -cover for NA, since by that assumption we x ; rB ; and r at the
1 -cover level for all i 2 I. From the preceding saving analysis we know that s1;NAP+1  s1;iP+1 for all
i 2 fLN;SAg. So, for the xed r and rB we know that if SP has 1-cover for NA it certainly has
1-cover for LN and SA. Due to xing ; rB ; and r we may from now on drop the superscript from
the notation of SP, and hence Btk becomes Bk; where Bk denotes SP that is started in period k and
the rate of interest paid on the contribution as well as the size of contribution are xed to the level
that satises 1-cover for NA.
Worthwhile savings program, and procrastination Any savings program with any xed
positive  and any rB > r would be certainly always worthwhile if agents possibilities to borrow
against the net present value of wealth were not constrained and if making the e¤ort were not costly,
i.e. if u(e) = 0. However, from the assumption  u(e) < 0 it follows that SP has to be worthwhile in
a such sense that the utility loss from making the e¤ort will be covered with increased consumption
22Of course, one could as well x  rst, and after that derive such interest rates rB and r that dened properties
of an l -cover would be satised.
23By setting the contribution  as given in Eq. (5), we get for our numerical calibration the contibution to be
approximately 3% of the salary. This is a common default in 401(k) retirement saving programs. See e.g. Madrian
and Shea (2001), and Choi et al (2004a).
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possibilities due to SP.
To illustrate this property let us consider two di¤erent cases, one where the agent makes and
the other where he does not make the e¤ort. Let Ct;Bti  fct;Btj gTj=t denote self(t)s consumption
plan when SP is available, and assume that self(t) makes the e¤ort in period t. Clearly, ct;Btj >
ctj for all j 2 NTt , for any  > 0, and for any rB > r regardless of the size of u(e): The planned
consumption increases since self(t)s discounted lifetime income has increased by the amount of


P+1 t
PP+1 t
=1 R

B  
PP t
=0 


, and so, self(t)s lifetime budget constraint has moved out-
wards. Since we have given to the agent a possibility to smooth out his consumption over the
life time, he will also do so. The incremental income will be then dispersed over the life time left
according to the agents intertemporal preferences. Thus, there exists incremental consumption j
such that ct;Btj = c
t
j + j for j  t.24 Then, denoting Ut(CBti )  Ut(Ct;Bti ) and respectively
Ut(C

i )  Ut(Cti ) neither 1 -cover nor the feasibility is su¢ cient to dene the sign of the di¤erence
between the intertemporal utilities with and without the savings program, i.e.
sign
h
Ut(CBli )  Ut(Ci )
i
; (6)
which is eventually crucial when the agent solves whether starting of SP is worthwhile at all
(sign[] > 0 for some l) or not (sign[]  0 for all l).25 For any given SP the sign of the Eq.(6) is
solely determined by the size of e as we will show next.
Now, Ut
 fctj + "jgTj=t > Ut  fctj gTj=t for any "j > 0. On the other hand, "j > 0 if and only
if the agent considers making the e¤ort in some period l  t.26 Hence, in the case where self(t)
makes the e¤ort in the period t his intertemporal utility Ut according to his plan can be written as
follows.
Ut

CBti ; u (e)

= Ut
 fctj + jgTj=t; u (e) = U^t  fctj + jgTj=t u(e) = Ut  fctj gTj=t for some u(e);
24For example for NA in our setup planned incremental consumption is given by the rule t = 
 1t+i, and hence
according to the agents preferences the incemental consumption is the same for all periods from period t+1 onwards
and tWt for the current period t, where Wt =W
Bt
t  Wt:
25We include the equality in the case of not considering SP worthwhile, and hence we make an implicit assumption
that if there is no gain no loss from starting SP the agent prefers not to make the e¤ort.
26Recall that Ut(C
Bl
t ) and Ut(C
t
t ) are just the imaginary intertemporal utilities that would be realised if the
subsequent selves were able to stick to self(t)s consumption-saving plan. Whether he really is capable of abiding by
his consumption plan depends completely on his type as we saw in the last section.
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where we have decomposed the intertemporal utility in two pieces by dening
U^t()  Ut(; e) + u(e);
where U^t() is the pure intertemporal utility from consumption.27
Clearly, SP gives the higher incremental incomes the sooner it will be started. On the other
hand, from the viewpoint of self(t) ; SP yields the smaller utility loss from making the e¤ort the
later program is started. Hence, the total e¤ect from making the e¤ort on the intertemporal utility
depends on the relative rate of depreciation between a utility loss and a loss in incomes due to
procrastination of starting SP. Then, SP is worthwhile from self(t)s perspective if and only if
min
n
k  tj sign
h
Ut(CBki )  Ut(Ci )
i
> 0
o
 P:
In words, self(t) would like to start SP as soon as possible but dislikes the utility loss caused by
making the e¤ort, and hence he has a temptation to procrastinate it. If there is no such period before
retiring that the utility gain from SP outweighs a utility loss from making the e¤ort, self(t) abandons
SP for good and all the results concerning consumption-saving behaviour are analogical from that
self onwards with the analysis in the previous sections. For worthwhileness and attractivety we get
then the following formal denitions.
Denition 2 For self(t) ; t 2 NP ; a savings program is
i) worthwhile if for some h 2 NPt holds sign
h
Ut(CBhi )  Ut(Ci )
i
> 0;
ii) ht-worthwhile if ht  min
n
h 2 NPt
 sign hUt(CBhi )  Ut(Ci )i > 0o;
iii) attractive if ht = t:
Period ht is the rst period when making the e¤ort, and thus, SP is worthwhile from self(t)s
perspective.28 Next, we will make a highly simplifying assumption about agents behaviour, but
we consider it plausible and reasonable due to agents shortsightedness.
27We say pureintertemporal utility, since the e¤ect of making the e¤ort is purged from U^t() by adding u(e) to
the real intertemporal utility Ut (; u(e)).
28Our denition of the worthwhileness is analogous with the denitions of  worthwhile and  best task proposed
in ODonoghue and Rabin (2001b). However, due to slight di¤erences in the set ups we use the term "worthwhile for
self(t)" to describe the  worthwhile task and the term "h t worthwhile for self(t)" to describe the  best task.
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Assumption 1 If ht > t, then Ct;Bhti = (C
t jWt) ; if ht = t, then Ct;Bht =

Ct jWBptt

;
where (C jW ) denotes the consumption plan C conditional on wealth W ,and pt denotes the
optimal starting period for self(t) from his perspective.
Assumption (1) says that if SP is unattractive for self(t), he considers that it will not be attractive
for any subsequent self either, and hence he makes the consumption-saving plan conditional on his
net present value of real wealth. Self(t) considers that since he would not start SP in the current
period, there is no reason for him to assume that he will start it in the future. This kind of feature
of behaviour can be interpreted as procrastinated decision making, i.e. the agent delays making
his decision about making the decision.29 From now on we refer to delayed decision making by
second order procrastination. Assumption (1) says also that if, on the other hand, SP is attractive
for self(t), he then makes the plan about the optimal starting period and in addition forms the
consumption plan conditional on the present value of considered wealth.30
Take now the viewpoint of self(t) and consider some attractive savings program for him. It is
important to notice that even though SP is attractive for self(t) it does not mean that the current
period would be the optimal period to start SP from self(t)s viewpoint. From self(t)s perspective it
would be optimal to start the attractive SP in period p that solves maxfpgPp=t Ut(C
Bp
i ) conditional
on that self(p) abide by self(t)s starting plan. In general, for any self(t) and for any attractive
savings program an optimal starting period will be chosen subject to perceptions about future
behaviour. Without loss of generality and to ensure the uniqueness of the solution from self(t)s
viewpoint, we assume that if there are several ps that satisfy the maximisation, then self chooses
the minimum from the set of possible options.31 We can formally dene the optimal starting period
from the viewpoint of self(t) as follows.
Denition 3 Self(t)s optimal starting period, pt; for an attractive savings program satises
pt  minfp 2 NPt
maxUt(CBpi ) s.t. perceptions about future behaviourg:
29This kind of delaying of decision making is not peculiar. It is quite common for one to say that he needs a while
before he is ready to make his nal decision about the subject of concern.
30The second part of the assumption is discussed in Section 5. See also Hsieh (2003) for a closer analysis of
anticipated income changes.
31This assumption implies that the agent is not tempted by unnecessary procrastination. If there are several same
intertemporal utility resulting possibilities to start the attractive saving program self(t) considers that the sooner the
better. Note also that this assumption is not contradictory to the assumption which denes the interface between
worthwhile and not-worthwhile, and says that the agent considers the saving program not-worthwhile if it gives the
same utility as never starting the saving program gives.
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Then, adopting the fashion of procrastination from ODonoghue and Rabin (2001b), we say that
self(t) procrastinates whenever an attractive savings program exists but self(t) prefers starting of
it in some later period to starting it in the current period.32 The formal denition follows.
Denition 4 Self(t) procrastinates if t < pt.
Of course we do not say that the agent procrastinates if there is no worthwhile savings program
available for any self(t), i.e. if fhj sign
h
Ut(CBhi )  Ut(Ci )
i
> 0g = ? for all t 2 NP and for all
h 2 NPt . Hence, no procrastination by denitions emerges if there is no 1st order procrastination.33
4.2 Procrastination analysis
Given the revised set up, the intertemporal utility maximisation problem can be now written in the
following form for any non-retired self(t) of any type i 2 I.34
max
fctgTt=t;l
U it = ln

cit
ekt

+ 
T tX
=t
 ln

ci+1
ek+1

(7)
s:t
T tX
=0
 ci+t  Rst +
P tX
=0
 (w   d+t) + P t 1Bl
=Wt + 
 
P+1 t
P t lX
=1
RB  
P tX
=l

!
=WBlt :
To consider planning problems of selves who face also the problem of selecting the starting
period let us assume that SP is not started yet, it is attractive to self(t), and that self(t) is not
retired:35 Let us x the e¤ort cost at some commonly known level. Self(t) faces then two tasks.
32ODonoghue and Rabin (2001b) denes that the agent procrastinates if his self(t) follows the strategy that
involves not to complete the task even though it would be utility increasing.
33 In this paper we do not concentrate on the 2nd order procrastination, and thus this is the reason why we do not
say that the agent procrastinates if it is of the 2nd order.
34Since procrastination is a relevant topic to study only before retiring, our formulation for the agents problem
includes Bl. Moreover, when studying consumption-saving planning of the retirement periods, it is clear that the
analysis is equivalent with the analysis of regural saving. This follows from the fact that the retired agent faces
completely the same utility maximising problem as in the case of regular saving, and the maximisation problem is
di¤ent only in the dimension of possibly di¤erent retirement time wealth.
35Remark that selves (i) who do not nd SP attractive, (ii) who are subsequent to self(l), i.e. to self who started
SP, and (iii) also selves who are already retired, i.e. self(P + 1; :::; T ), do not meet the problem of starting SP.
Fortunately, we have already completed the analysis about them. It has been done in the preceeding sections where
SP is absent. The reasoning is following. Consider any self(t) who belongs in one of the mentioned group. Self(t)s
task is then to make the plan that maximises his intertemporal utility. Thus, the concept of his task is exactly the
same with his counterpart in the world where SP is absent. Everything, except possible di¤erences in wealth, is
equivalent with the problems faced in the analysis of the basic set up.
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Firstly, he must plan when to start SP if ever. Secondly, he has to make a consumption-saving plan
which maximises his intertemporal utility. So far, we have xed ; rB ; and r; and hence we have
xed Bj 8j 2 NPt . Self(t) is thus able to derive all the possible considered wealth levels, WBjt , and
consequently, all possible intertemporal utilities he could reach if he started the attractive savings
program in some particular period j: Self(t) then chooses the plan that maximises his intertemporal
utility given his perceptions about future behaviour.
Since perceptions di¤er across the types of the agent, it is possible that not only consumption-
saving plans but also planned and realised starting periods di¤er across the di¤erent types in the
presence of SP. In the next subsections we will derive and discuss about the plans and realised
actions between di¤erent selves and across the di¤erent types. Focus is mainly on when (if ever)
the agent starts SP. We start by analysing NA.
4.2.1 Naive agent and SP
Consider self(t) of NA, and assume that ht = t. By denition, SP is attractive if starting it
immediately gives higher intertemporal utility than never starting it, that is
Ut(CBt)  U(Ct) > 0
() U^t(CBt)  U(Ct) > u(e);
and explicitly
e <
 
WBtt
Wt
! 1t
 ANAt ; (8)
where we have dened ANAt as the supremum of the e¤ort cost to keep SP still attractive for self(t).
From now on ANAt is called the attractiveness.
Procrastination is tempting if starting SP in some later period gives higher intertemporal utility
than starting it immediately. Formally, procrastination is tempting if
U^t(CBk)  k tu(e)  U(Ct) > U^t(CBt)  u(e)  U(Ct) for some k 2 NPt+1
, e >
 
WBtt
WBkt
!  1t
1 k t
for some k 2 NPt+1: (9)
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Procrastination emerges then if pt = k; k > t and self(t) anticipates that there exists self(n) ;
n  k, such that pn  k.
The next lemma facilitates the analysis by asserting that if procrastination of l periods is luc-
rative so is any shorter time interval procrastination down to 1 period procrastination.
Lemma 2 If there exists k 2 NPt+1 such that e >

W
Bt
t
W
Bk
t
  1t
1 k t
, then e >

W
Bt
t
WBnt
  1t
1 n t
for all
n 2 Nkt+1:
Now, self(t) of NA chooses to procrastinate if the conditions (8) and (9) hold and if he anticipates
that 9n 2 Nkt+1 such that self(n) chooses to start SP. Since NA considers always that his future
preferences are exponential, we know by the following lemma that if self(t) anticipates that for some
self(n) ; n  pt; the savings program is still attractive he is sure that self(n) will start the program.
Lemma 3 If SP is attractive, exponential discounter (ED) starts it immediately.
Along the previous lemma, we are able to say that if self(t) wants to procrastinate he never
considers to procrastinate longer than one period. However, the next lemma asserts that there
exists such e¤ort cost level that self(t) procrastinates and in addition self(t+ 1) will procrastinate.
Lemma 4 Given the revised set up, i = NA; and a non-binding intertemporal budget constraint,
there exists a level of the e¤ort cost e such that if pt = t+ 1 then p(t+1) = t+ 2:
As long as NA nds SP attractive and procrastination tempting he will also procrastinate. The
attractiveness is, however, decreasing in time as the next lemma shows us.
Lemma 5 Given the revised set up, and Wt  e 8t 2 NP ; the attractiveness ANAt 

W
Bt
t
Wt
 1t
is
decreasing in t.
From the previous lemmas it follows that NA will procrastinate until

W
Bt
t
W
Bt+1
t
  1t
1 
< e < ANAt
fails to hold, and if that happens he either starts SP or abandons it for good. Which action he
chooses, depends on which condition fails to hold.
Finally, from the properties of NAs reasoning and behaviour follow the next proposition.
Proposition 4 Given the revised set up and i = NA, an attractive savings program will be started
in the rst period or it will be never started while procrastinated at least one period before abandoning
it forever.
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To illustrate the import of Proposition (4) let us consider SP that could be some 401(k) program,
for example, which is available to NAs self(1), but enrollment on it is not automatic. Then, the
consequences might be the following. The agent nds the program worthwhile and attractive in the
rst period, but since there is some intermediate e¤ort cost to enroll on the program he considers
that he will start it in the next period. When the next period arrives the agent nds the program
still attractive but considers that he will start it after one period. However, since our agent has
fallacious perceptions about his future behaviour it happens that after some periods he does not
nd the program attractive any longer but considers that the e¤ort cost is too high compared to
the intertemporal utility increment from the program. Hence, he quits considering that he will
start the program and abandons it forever. Furthermore, all selves who found the 401(k) program
attractive but did not start it used considered wealth for optimising their consumption since they
anticipated that they will start SP. The consequences of consuming considered wealth are stated in
the next direct corollary of Proposition (4), and it completes the story for NA.
Corollary 1 If NAs self(1) does not start an attractive savings program, retirement savings will
be lower in the presence than in the absence of the savings program.
Corollary (1) is one of the most important results of our procrastination analysis. When in-
terpreted in other words it states that for an intermediate e¤ort cost levels NA would be better
o¤ in the absence of SP than what he is in the presence of it in terms of retirement time wealth.
To get the claimed result it is enough to consider the case where self(1) anticipates that he starts
SP in the period t = 2 , but self(2) does not nd SP attractive any longer. In this case the rst
element in the self(1)s consumption plan is c1;B2 = 1WB2 : Now, 1WB21 > 1W1 = c
1 and hence 
W2 j c1;B2

= R

W1   1WB21

< R (W1   1W1) =
 
W2 j c1

: If then the e¤ort cost is such
that self(2) abandons SP, it directly follows that the rest of consumption plans are made with lower
current wealth resulting in lower intertemporal utilities than in the absence of the SP. Furthermore,
the retirement savings are now necessarily lower compared to the case where SP is absent.
It is a striking result that very existence of SP is enough to cause a loss in the retirement savings
compared to the case where SP is absent. The results imply in addition that if the e¤ort cost is
such that the agent wants to procrastinate, it follows that the lower the e¤ort is in this inertia range
the severe the e¤ects of procrastination will be. We know that if self(1) does not start SP, there
does not exist a self who will start it. If the e¤ort cost is then in its lowest possible inertia level,
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the more periods it will take before the attractiveness diminishes low enough to cause abandoning
of SP. Hence, the lower is the e¤ort cost in the inertia range the more there will be periods when
selves use considered wealth resulting in even lower retirement savings.
4.2.2 Sophisticated agent and SP
We now turn to analysing sophisticated agents behaviour. According to the denition of sophistic-
ation, SA knows his future preferences, and hence he takes SCPs into account when forming plans
for consumption, saving, and about starting of SP. Just like NA also SA nds SP attractive if its
immediate starting gives higher intertemporal utility than never starting it. Formally
U^t(CBt)  U(Ct) > u(e);
and after some manipulation the explicit form of the attractiveness turns out to be
e <
WBtt
Wt
T tY
=1
 
WBtt+
Wt+
!
 ASAt
The attractiveness looks now slightly di¤erent and more complex at rst glance than what the NAs
respective condition appears to be. It is so due to SAs perfect knowledge. SA knows t+j = 
8j 2 NT t:
We are fortunately able to establish a lemma that ease the analysis by stating that the condition
of attractiveness for SAs self(1) simplies to the same form with the condition of attractiveness for
NAs self(1).
Lemma 6 Given the revised set up, ASA1 = ANA1 :
The importance of Lemma (6) becomes clearer when one considers intertype comparisons. We
can now always set the e¤ort cost at any level and we know that if NAs self(1) nds SP attractive
so does SAs. By Lemma (6) we, thus, avoid hesitation whether the e¤ort cost could be at such
level that SA nds SP attractive while NA does not, and vice versa.
As NAs also SAs self(t) nds procrastination tempting if from his perspective one period
procrastination gives him higher intertemporal utility than starting SP immediately. Formally,
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procrastination is tempting for self(t) if and only if
e >
0@ WBtt
W
Bt+1
t
T tY
=1
 
WBtt+
W
Bt+1
t+
!1A 11  ;
and hence, by using the trick shown in the proof of Lemma (6) ; procrastination is tempting for
self(1) if
e >
 
WB11
WB21
!  11
1 
: (10)
From Condition (10) we see that procrastination is tempting for SAs self(1) whenever it is tempting
for NAs self(1). It is crucial to understand at this point that even when self(1) of SA nds
procrastination tempting, he knows, due to sophistication, that his future selves will make their
own decisions about starting of SP, and hence self(1) does not necessarily delay starting of SP
at all. On the other hand, applying the analysis from ODonoghue and Rabin (1999c) we can
say in here that SA does never start SP if and only if he prefers never starting SP to starting it
immediately in period 1, i.e. SP will be never started if and only if e  ASA1 . It then follows that
self(1) delays starting of SP only if he knows that SP will be started in some period such that
a consumption structure is still utility increasing from his perspective given the realising starting
period. Otherwise, he starts an attractive savings program immediately and consumes according
c1 = W
B1
 ; where  2 NT . This means that self(1) resists the temptation to delay starting of
SP if there does not exist a such utility increasing consumption opportunity c11 that would trigger
later selves to start SP within tolerable amount of periods given c11 : As one might have noticed
from the previous, a new problem arises for the agent. Namely, what is the optimal consumption
c11 given the period when SP is started if that particular consumption choice is chosen.
To illustrate the complexity of this new problem we consider the simplest possible case where
the e¤ort cost is at such level that delaying is tempting for self(1) and if self(1) chooses to consume
according to the rule c11 = 1W
B2
1 , then self(2) nds SP still attractive and delaying tempting
but understands that if he tries to procrastinate one more period by consuming according the
rule c22 = 2W
B3
2 SP will be unattractive for self(3). I.e. with given c
2
2 the e  ASA3 would
hold for self(3) and he would abandon the savings program for good. Hence, self(2) might deviate
from consuming by the given rule and choose some strategically manipulative consumption level
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that makes self(3) to start SP. But then, if this consumption path induces smaller intertemporal
utility to self(1) than what he would be able to get if he deviated from his given consumption
rule c11 = 1W
B2
1 he certainly will deviate from it either by starting SP immediately or then
by choosing a manipulative consumption level which induces self(2) to choose optimally from the
self(1)s viewpoint so that self(2) either starts SP or chooses a manipulative consumption level that
induces self(3) to choose optimally from the viewpoints of both self(1) and self(2) etc.
As it should be clear now, there might be a continuum of possible choices for self(1) that
would yield the same intertemporal utility from his perspective. To go around this problem and
to implement a good device to make intertype comparisons, we will next make an assumption that
constrains remarkably SAs strategy space and brings his behaviour closer to NAs behaviour. The
assumption will make SAs strategy space basically the same with NA what comes to consumption
possibilities with the exception that SA uses the given consumption options strategically.
Assumption 2 Given the revised set up, i = SA, and an attractive non-started savings program;
self(t) optimises by using the strategy that involves
i) self(t) to choose his consumption, ctt ; from the choice set which elements are c
mc
t = tW
Bt+1
t ;
and ct;Btt = tW
Bt
t ;
ii) and if self(t) chooses ctt = c
t;Bt
t he starts SP immediately.
How can we interpret Assumption (2)? One possible way to consider it is to place it in the context
of bounded rationality.36 The agent knows that he can either start SP immediately, or then he can
manipulate future selvesbehaviour but now, due to bounded rationality, the only manipulative
consumption choice self(t) is able to use in his calculations when conducting backwards induction
is the consumption level that is as if he started SP in the next period.37 Hence, we give SA
36Another way to consider Assumption (2) is to interpret it as a rule-of-thumb. The agent considers in every period
whether to start SP or not, and if he wants to guarantee that he knows when to start it he uses the rule-of-thumb,
tW
Bt+1
t ; and knows that he the similar rule also in later periods if he decides to procrastinate then as well. More
about these kind of rules of thumb see e.g. Lettau and Uhlig (1999).
37Note that the agent prefers as quick as possible starting of SP as long as he does not have to start
it by himself. Remark then that the attractivety can be written also in the following form ASAt = 
1 +


P+1 t
PP+1 t
=1 R

B 
PP 
=0 


Wt
! 1t
; and hence from that expression we see that the bigger the attract-
ivety for self(t) the more self(t  1) consumes (Wt is the smaller the bigger is consumption in the previous period).
Hence, Assumption (2) gives to the agent a weak tool to manipulate the future attractivety level in the direction
that would shorten procrastination. On the other hand, it gives to the agent a powerful tool to try to make SP still
attractive for a self in the next period. However, NAs behaviour is invariat to Assumption (2), and so, the analysis
of NA stays valid also under Assumption (2).
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exactly those consumption choices that NA uses when he decides whether to start SP immediately
or procrastinate starting of it. We are then able to make interesting comparisons in di¤erences
between NAs and SAs behaviour when SA faces the consumption options of NA.
By Assumption (2) we can establish a simple rule for self(t) about when to start SP immediately.
This rule is asserted in the following lemma, and it states that if the manipulative consumption in
period t pushed the attractiveness level for self(t+1) too low then self(t) starts the savings program
immediately. The lemma certies also that indenite procrastination never emerges if the agent is
SA.
Lemma 7 Given the revised set up with Assumption (2), self(t) starts an attractive savings program
immediately whenever cmct ) ASAt+1  e (or if t = P ):
Lemma (7) gives an end-rulefor procrastination. Intuitively, if the agent procrastinates enough
it follows that the level of attractiveness diminishes low causing the correctly future behaviour
predicting agent to start SP in the last period among the periods when SP is attractive. Moreover,
due to our explicit choice for the manipulative consumption the longest possible procrastination, p,
is exactly the same with NA. The crucial exception here is that by Lemma (7) SAs self(p) will
always start SP while NAs counterpart still considers that he will start SP in period p + 1 but
fails with his plan since actually self(p + 1) abandons SP for good.38
In general, SAs any self(t) procrastinates only if use of the manipulative consumption leads to
future behaviour that guarantees starting of SP within tolerable amount of periods from self(t)s
perspective. The longest tolerable procrastination for self(t), ptolt ; is given by
ptolt  max
n
pt 2 NPt+1 j U (Cmct )  Ut

CW
Bt

 0
o
; where
Ut (Cmc) = ln

tW
Bt+1
t

+ 
 
pt 2X
=1
 ln

+tW
B+t+1
+t

+
T 1X
=pt 1
 ln

+tW
Bpt
+t
!
 (pt t 1) ln (e) ; and
Ut

CW
Bt

= ln

tW
Bt
t

+ 
T 1X
=1
 ln

+tW
Bt
+t

  ln (e) ;
38Of course, also NAs self(P ) would start an attractive SP. However, since the attractiveness diminishes fairly
quickly in the model when the manipulative consumption is used, and if there are many working periods as a total,
the attractiveness level drops easily below 1-worthwhile level before time reaches t = P causing NA to abandon SP
before t = P:
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and if ptolt = ? for all pt 2 NPt+1 we say that procrastination is intolerable for self(t) and we denote
ptolt = t. We then get that when SP is attractive for self(t), he rst solves the longest possible
procrastination, p; and his own tolerance, ptolt ; given the rule for the manipulative consumption.
Then, he solves for his future selvestolerances, i.e. self(t) solves for ptolk ; where k 2 Np 1t+1 : After
solving p; ptolt ; and p
tol
k for k 2 Np 1t+1 self(t) is able to conduct backwards induction about his future
behaviour resulting in nally the choice of starting SP or procrastinating it. These choices are fully
described by the consumption choices ctt 2 ftWBtt ; tWBt+1t g. Clearly, self(t) delays starting of
SP if and only if there exists self(k > t), k  ptolt , who starts the savings program. Otherwise
self(t) starts SP immediately and no procrastination emerges. The next proposition collects SAs
behaviour about starting of SP in di¤erent cases.
Proposition 5 Given the revised set up with Assumption (2), and i = SA, if a savings program is
attractive for self(t), then
i) self(t) procrastinates if there exists self(k), k 2 Nptoltt+1; who starts the savings program;
ii) self(t) starts the savings program immediately if such self(k) does not exist, or if cmct ) ASAt+1  e;
or if t = P
A straightforward application of Proposition (5) provides us the main result for the analysis
of SA. This result is established in the following corollary. It asserts that if a savings program
is attractive to any self(t), t 2 NP , it will be started during the periods that belongs to self(1)s
tolerable amount of periods of procrastination. It also makes an important point of noting that as
a consequence SA is able to utilise SP so that the accumulated wealth for the pension will be now
greater than in the absence of SP.
Corollary 2 Given the revised set up and i = SA, if a savings program is attractive for some
self(t)
i) it will be started in some period p 2 Nptol1 with certainty; and thus is never abandoned for good;
and
ii) the retirement savings are greater in the presence than in the absence of the savings program.
Corollary (2) distinguishes clearly between behaviour of SA and NA. While NAs self(1) starts
SP only if the e¤ort cost is so low that it is not tempting to procrastinate, self(1) of SA starts the
savings program immediately also in the case where procrastination is tempting but succumbing
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to temptation would lead to severe procrastination from self(1)s perspective. On the other hand,
self(1) of SA may delay starting of SP when he knows that some of his subsequent incarnations
within the range of tolerable procrastination will nd further procrastination too costly in terms
of utility, and hence starts SP. In similar situation NAs self(1) always procrastinates but his false
perceptions about future behaviour cause only overconsumption, and actually, if he does not start
SP immediately nor does any of his subsequent selves.
4.2.3 Learning naive agent and SP
We now turn to analysing behaviour of the learning naive agent in the presence of SP. It should be
clear at this stage of the study that the logic LN uses in his decision making, excluding the rst
period, is the same with the logic SA uses. On the other hand, what comes to self(1) of LN the
analysis is already conducted. Namely, self(1) of LN makes exactly the same choices that self(1) of
NA does. Furthermore, we can maintain Assumption (2) in force also for LN. We immediately note
here that if SP is attractive and procrastination is tempting for self(1) of LN he will procrastinate.
This procrastination and the consumption choice based on anticipated starting of SP in the next
period is clearly in line with Assumption (2). The consumption choice self(1) makes conditional on
his perception about certain starting of SP in the next period is exactly the same he would choose if
he procrastinated under Assumption (2). Hence, in the analysis about LN we maintain Assumption
(2) with the following minor change: in the assumption, i = SA is replaced with i = LN: We can
then directly establish the rst result concerning LNs behaviour.
Proposition 6 Given the revised set up, i = LN ,
i) an attractive savings program will be started in the rst period or it will be procrastinated at least
one period; and
ii) if the e¤ort cost is at such level that self(2) of NA would abandon SP then LNs self(2) abandons
SP resulting in lower level of retirement savings in the presence than in the absence of SP; otherwise
iii) some self(t) either starts SP or abandons it after procrastination of t  1 periods, resulting in,
respectively, higher or lower retirement savings in the presesence than in the absence of SP.
It is important to understand that the rst two points in Proposition (6) follow directly from
Proposition (4) and Corollary (1). Furthermore, it is a trivial consequence of our assumption about
LNs ability to develop in the dimension of awareness about future SCPs. On the other hand, it
28
emphasises the importance of time for learning about preferences: the lack of adequate time to learn
about preferences can become costly. The more interesting parts of analysis consist of behaviour of
those selves who have already learned something about their inconsistent planning. This is to say
that we mainly concentrate on selves from the second period onwards, i.e. on the behaviour and
its concequences noted in point (iii) of the proposition.
Once self(2) learns that he will have SCP in the future his measure for the attractiveness about
SP changes from the form of NAs attractiveness measure to SAs attractiveness measure
ALN2 = ASA2 :
But then, once again we can use the analogy of the proof of Lemma (6) to establish that actually
ALN2 = ANA2 : (11)
It is notable that for all LNs selves the current attractiveness level is correct but each self uses
erroneous future attractiveness levels. This can be easily seen by considering self(t)s perception
about the attractiveness level for self(t + 1). Let us denote it by Att+1. We can then conduct the
following inequality condition.
Att+1 > ALNt+1; (12)
where the inequality follows, since self(t) anticipates MPC to be lower in the next period than what
it in reality appears to be. Hence, in the case where self(t) nds procrastination tempting and
delays starting of SP in a faith of completing the task in the next period, it can happen that when
the next period arrives self(t+ 1) does not consider SP attractive any longer, and hence abandons
it for good. This happens whenever Att+1 > e  ALNt+1: In words, when the e¤ort cost is in the given
interval self(t) mistakenly uses the manipulative consumption since he considers that subsequent
self(t+ 1) will start SP. A possibility to this kind of mistake diminishes when the agent learns the
size of SCP more accurately.
Since self(t) uses the biased MPC value (t)(t+j) instead of the correct t+j for all j 2 NT t; the
attractiveness level for immediately adjacent period is not the only falsely computed attractiveness
level but due to miscalculated magnitudes of future manipulative consumptions, the anticipated
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attractiveness levels for all periods k  t + 1 will be false, too.39 LNs self(t) anticipates that if
he uses the manipulative consumption in the future period t + 1 its size will be (t)(t+1)W
Bt+2
t+1 from
which we see that ct;mct+1 < c
mc
t+1; and hence the manipulative consumption is considered to be lower
than what it in reality would be if it were used in period t + 1. This, for its part, leads to a
biased estimate about the attractiveness level for self(t+ 1). Biasedness for the rest of the future
attractiveness levels can be naturally derived analogously.
The only di¤erence between LNs and SAs strategy choices will follow from the biased (t)(t+)
that self(t) of LN uses when he chooses the strategy. Mispredicting the future attractiveness levels
may cause LN to choose an suboptimal strategy. The anticipated future attractiveness levels a¤ect
directly the agents calculations about the anticipated longest possible procrastination pt; where t
refers again to the index of the optimising self. The other source for mistakes is the anticipated
future tolerance level. Self(t) considers that he will tolerate procrastination more in the future
than he actually does. As we saw in the analysis of SA the longest possible procrastination and
the tolerance for procrastination play leading roles in choosing the optimal strategy. Hence, extra
periods of procrastination and possibly even abandoning of SP in a case where it was attractive for
some self may become apparent in LNs behaviour.
Since LNs behaviour consists of parts of NAs and SAs behaviour we consider that closed form
solutions about LNs behaviour would not bring any new insight to the study. Due to this fact,
we complete the analysis in more interesting, descriptive, and appealing way. Namely, in the next
section we will illustrate the behaviour of the di¤erent agent types both in the absence and in the
presence of SP by using numerical analysis.
5 Numerical analysis
In this section we demonstrate the previous analyses by a numerical example. The example is
based on calibration where T = 50; P = 40; w = $25; 000; r = :0375; rB = 2r;  = :85; and
e 2 [$1:64; $2:6]: These choices result in  = :96 and  = $792:74: By using the calibration we get
Figure 1 that illustrates several di¤erent aspects in four subgures 1:1  1:4: These subgures will
be discussed separately in the following subsections.
39Recall that the manipulative consumption for any period k was given by the rule ck;mck = kW
Bk+1
k :
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Figure 1.1 In Figure 1.1 we have plotted the realising starting period as a function of e¤ort cost
level. The e¤ort cost level has been chosen to be within range e 2 [$1:64; $2:6] since when e < $1:64
SP is always started immediately and on the other hand when e > $2:6 SP will be abandon ed
immediately. The starting period gets value 0 only if SP has been abandoned after procrastination.
As we have shown in formal analysis, NA starts the savings program immediately or then he
never starts it. Due to this, we have only LNs and SAs choices in Figure 1.1. For SA it is apparent
that he starts SP in the rst period or then in the second period, and only if the e¤ort cost is
relatively high he waits until third period while for relatively very high e¤ort cost he chooses to
start in the second period due to the fact that waiting still one more period would cause abandoning
of SP. When the e¤ort cost is low SP stays long attractive. This feature gives more periods for
LN to learn about his behaviour, and hence unnecessary abandoning due to fallacious perceptions
happens only when the e¤ort cost is relatively high or very high. Intermediate e¤ort cost levels
yield the least procrastination for LN. As a conclusion, it is clearly present in the example that
SA starts always an attractive SP while LN makes mistakes when choosing the strategy and these
mistakes can cause loosing SP if the e¤ort cost level is high enough. LN never starts SP before SA
but might choose a strategy that leads to abandoning it even though SA starts SP.
Figure 1.2 While the realising starting period was plotted in Figure 1.1, Figure 1.2 shows the
length of procrastination in the cases where SP is nally abandoned. Length of procrastination
gets value 0 when SP is abandoned without procrastination or is started after procrastination.
Otherwise the length of procrastination is the last period when the agent has still considered that
he will start SP in the future and hence was using the considered wealth. Since SA always starts
an attractive SP and never abandons it, his choices are omitted from Figure 1.2 and only NAs and
LNs choices are present.
Since the e¤ort cost level is in such range that NA will not start SP in the rst period he
procrastinates as long as he nds it attractive. This means that the lower is the e¤ort cost level the
longer SP will be attarctive and hence the longer the procrastination. For LN, low level of the e¤ort
cost gives better possibility to learn his SCP and hence no abandoning with long procrastination
emerges. LN makes costly mistakes only when the e¤ort cost is high enough so that there are not
enough periods to learn about SCPs before the attractiveness level decreases so low that the agent
abandons SP.
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Figure 1: Results of the numerical example.
Figure 1.3 Wealth at the time of retirement between the cases where SP is present and absent is
compared in Figure 1.3. Hence the gure plots the di¤erenceWSP (P + 1) WNSP (P + 1) ; where
superscripts SP and NSP refer to existence and non-existence of SP respectively.
The biggest di¤erences are between NA and LN as well as between NA and SA. SA always
gains from the existence of SP for the given range of the e¤ort cost while NA always su¤ers from
it. However, the greater is the e¤ort cost the less time NA nds SP attractive and hence the less
time he then uses considered wealth without starting SP. Naturally, NAs wealth at the time of
retirement in the presence of SP is the less di¤erent from the wealth at the time of retirement in the
absence of SP the higher is the e¤ort cost. LN gains almost always from the existence of SP and
su¤ers from it only for relatively high or very high e¤ort cost levels. For low levels of the e¤ort cost
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LN makes almost as well as SA but due the failures in planning when to start SP LN procrastinates
longer than SA and has smaller wealth at the time of retirement. If the e¤ort cost level is relatively
high or very high LN does not have adequate time to learn his preferences and hence he misses SP
with fallacious starting plans.
Figure 1.4 In Figure 1.4 we have compared wealth at the time of retirement in the cases of
voluntary and involuntary saving programs. For a voluntary savings program we have considered
SP as it is given in the revised set up while for the involuntary savings program we have considered
a case where the agent is forced to save from the rst period onwards according to SP.
We nd that involuntary enrollment in the program would result always higher or the same
wealth at the time of retirement than voluntary enrollment, which is not surprising since with
respect to the magnitude of retirement wealth the agent cant make better o¤ than what he is able
to attain if he started SP in the rst period. For SA it is almost the same whether SP is voluntary
or involutary, he makes almost as well in both cases. For LN the same holds for low levels of e¤ort
cost but when the e¤ort cost is relatively high or very high he starts to su¤er from the voluntary
system. Clearly, for NA the involuntary system would make the greatest improvement as he would
gain from it relatively a great deal of money.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we focused on some existence e¤ects of a retirement savings program. The analysis
of the basic set up reveals us that when the agent has hyperbolic intertemporal preferences with
logarithmic instantaneous utility function backward looking behaviour does not a¤ect the realising
saving choices when retirement savings program is absent. All the agent types, naive, learning
naive, and sophisticate, make the same consumption choices but only the sophisticated agent is
able to form a time-consistent consumption plan. Hence, the retirement savings are, as well, the
same across the di¤erent types in the absence of the savings program. When a lucrative retirement
savings program with xed contribution is incorporated into the basic set up the agent type matters
and retirement savings can be di¤erent between the types. Enrollment on the savings program is
considered costly in terms of utility while the retirement savings program is made lucrative by
putting higher interest rate on savings through the program than what it is on the regular checking
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account savings.
The most striking result is that for certain substatially low levels of the e¤ort cost the plain
existence of the retirement savings program yields always lower retirement savings for the naive
agent and some times also for the learning naive agent than what they would be able to attain
in the absence of the retirement savings program. For the same levels of the e¤ort cost, the
sophisticated agent, for his part, always gains from the existence of the retirement savings program
and attains higher retirement savings through the program than what he would otherwise able to
get. The results follow from the e¤ort cost, anticipation about future behaviour and exibility in
the budget constraint. The e¤ort cost on enrolling on the retirement savings program makes the
agents to procrastinate their completion of the starting task in a faith that there exists a self in the
future who will start the savings program. Since the agent believes that he really is going to start
the program in the future he takes the increased income stream into account and consumes some
fractions from that even before the enrollment. This is possible if there is exibility in the budget
constraint. Finally, if the anticipation about future behaviour happens to be incorrect in a sense
that future selves do not nd the program attaractive any longer, it will be abandoned. But then,
due to preceding selvesconsumption of the imaginary wealth, the retirement savings can not be as
high as what they would have been if the savings program were completely absent.
The naive agent always considers that his subsequent self will start the program, and actually
in our model it happens then that if the naive agent does not start the savings program in the very
rst period it will be never started but procrastinated at least one period, resulting in decrease in
retirement savings compared to the case where the savings program is absent. The sophisticated
agent is the opposite to the naive and always starts an attractive savings program in some period
that ensures higher retirement savings than in the absence of the program. This is possible for selves
of the sophisticated agent since they know perfectly their future behaviour and are thus able to
choose strategically correct actions to make it sure that an attractive retirement savings program
is started in some period. In some cases, learning naive gains from the existence of the savings
program and for some cases he su¤ers from it. All that matters for the learning naive is the amount
of the periods he has for learning about his self-control problems. That is, the e¤ort cost must be
on such level that he has enough periods to learn before the attractivety drops too low. If the latter
happened the retirement savings would be lower than in the absence of retirement savings program
and if the former happened then the case would be opposite for retirement savings.
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In the numerical analysis we illustrated also the di¤erence in retirement savings between the
cases of non-automatic enrollment and automatic enrollment on a retirement savings program. It
is obvious that in our set up the automatic enrollment yields greater retirement savings than the
non-automatic does. Also, the automatic enrollment always yields higher retirement savings than
what the savings are in the absence of the program. However, an important nding from this is
that once the retirement savings program is implemented and while the di¤erence in retirement
savings is fairly small for learning naives and sophisticates, naives would gain relatively much from
automatic enrollment. This implies that sophisticates do not su¤er the chosen system never alot
but for naives the type of a chosen system can have a big di¤erence. Whether the chosen system
a¤ects learning naives depends the most on the magnitude of the e¤ort cost. If the e¤ort level
is relatively low they have enough time to learn and hence they are more or less the same in the
cases of involuntary and voluntary systems while for high and very high levels of the e¤ort cost
involuntary system would be denitely better for them.
Finally, since there is a growing tendency to put more responsibility and pressure on individuals
about their own retirement funding, we should concentrate on implications of a retirement savings
program and how the enrollment on it should be done. As it is now clear, the results establish
that fairly low levels of the e¤ort cost can make relatively big di¤erences in retirement wealth.
If we believed that only naive types exist then, in principle, all the saving possibilities should be
equal so that no optional saving programs existed, or the e¤ort cost on enrolling on retirement
saving programs should be very low, or the involuntary system should be exercised. On the other
hand, if we believed that there exist only sophisticates the only thing to be cared of would be to
keep the e¤ort cost only on intermediately low so that the savings program remains attarctive for
an individual who is just on the phase of starting to work regularly. We consider, however, that
in reality neither of these extreme types probably does exist and all individuals are more or less
equiped with capabilities to learn about them selves what comes to retirement saving, and that the
capability to learn just varies across individuals.40 In addition, since we do not know the fractions
of these di¤erent types in economy, then the e¤ort cost should be lowered below the level that makes
procrastination tempting. As easy as it sounds there exists a problem, though. It is reasonable to
believe that the lower we would like to push the e¤ort cost level the more expensive it would be.
40Then, one could consider naives as extremely slow to learn and sophisticates extremely quick to learn.
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Thus, if it is too costly to push the e¤ort cost level low enough, to avoid losses in naivesretirement
savings we should let the e¤ort cost be high. But then, also learning naives will start to su¤er
from the existence of the savings program since they do not have enough time to learn from their
self-control problems. Hence the main problem with the existence of the savings program is that if
the e¤ort cost is on low level but procrastination is tempting, naives are hurt while learning naives
and sophisticates are doing quite well with their savings. Letting the e¤ort cost to rise helps naives
but hurts then learning naives, while sophisticates are still doing well. If the e¤ort cost is still let
to be higher both naives and learning naives will be out of interest to save along retirement savings
program and they do not su¤er that much about the existence of SP, while sophisticates still do well.
This implies a meta-result which says that if we consider all the agents to be learning naives with
di¤erent capabilities to learn, then if lowering the e¤ort cost is expensive relative to hastening the
learning capability, possibilities to learn about self-control problems should be improved. If them
both are expensive, it should be tried to avoid heterogeneity in di¤erent possibilities to save or let
the e¤ort cost to rise so that only sophisticates start it while naives and learning naives abandon
it fairly quickly. Lastly, the results impy intuitively that if the publicly nanced retirement system
provided originally more than the savings program yields for SA, the publicly nanced system could
be maintained by decreasing the replacement rate on the respective of SAs ability to save along SP
and all the types should accepted it.
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Appendix
A Di¤erent agent types
Let us now present the denition of di¤erent types of the agent in terms of agents awareness about
his future SCP. Our type classication follows the lines of the verbal type classication given in
ODonoghue and Rabin (2001b, forthcoming). However, we depart from their denition by dening
a new agent type, the learning naive agent (LN), which replaces the partially naive agent (PN).41
By denition the agent has SCP if he uses non-exponential discounting. The agent can be aware
of his future SCPs only if he is aware of the fact that he will use non-exponential discounting in
the subsequent periods as well.42 Since  is the only parameter that causes discounting to be non-
exponential in our model, the denition of awareness about future SCPs reduces to dening agents
self(t)s perceptions about (t+j) We can then dene awareness formally in the following way.
Denition 5 Self(t) is aware of his future SCPs if (t)(t+j) 6= 1 for j 2 NT t; where (t)(t+j) denotes
self(t)s perception about t+j, i.e. a perception about the value of  in self(t+j)s utility function
Ut+j :
Denition (5) denes only whether self(t) is aware of the fact that  6= 1 also for the future
selves. However, the denition does not tell us anything about agents knowledge of s true value
in the later periods. It is now completely possible that the agent is aware of the fact t+j 6= 1 but

(t)
(t+j) 6= . It then follows that the denition in question does not tell us whether the agent knows
his subsequent selvesreal preferences even when he is aware about future SCPs. To distinguish
between the di¤erent agent types we use agents self(t)s di¤erent levels of awareness about (t+j):
Starting from NA, we say that the agent is NA if his every self( t 2 NT 2) is unaware about future
SCPs. According to Denition (5), self(t) is unaware about future SCPs if (t)(t+j) = 1 8j 2 NT t:43
In the same manner we dene SA. We say that the agent is SA if his every self( t 2 NT 2) is
perfectly aware about future SCPs. Then, by Denition (5) self(t) is aware about future SCPs if

(t)
(t+j) 6= 1 8j 2 NT t: To make the agent to be perfectly aware about future SCPs we require

(t)
(t+j) =  8j 2 NT t:44
There is still one undened type, namely LN. The motivation for introducing the learning naive
agent into the type category of hyperbolic agents is, in the rst place, that in the recent literature
41Along ODonoghue and Rabin (2001b) PN is aware of his future SCP but he constantly underestimates its
magnitude. In other words, any self(t) of PN considers that he will have SCP in the future with the magnitude ^,
but he considers that 1 > ^ > ; and hence is over-optimistic about his capabilities to control himself in the future.
Recall, the bigger  is the smaller SCP is.
42Here we implicitely assume that the agent understands what it means if his intertemporal utility function
incorporates non-exponential discounting.
43Only selves from 1 to T   2 are required to be unaware, since there is no meaning to discuss about awareness in
the trivial periods T 1 and T . For self(T   1 ) there is only passive self(T) left who does not have the intertemporal
preferences. Hence, it does not matter what self(T   1 ) considers about the intertemporal preferences of self(T).
Moreover, since by the construction of our model we assume that all the types of the agent know perfectly their last
day in live, we can set with out loss of generality that if t = T then j = 0 and consequently (T )
(T+j)
=  for all i 2 I:
44Note that perfect awareness implies awareness. If the (t)
(t+j)
=  8j 2 NT t and  6= 1; it is clear that

(t)
(t+j)
=  8j 2 NT t

)


(t)
(t+j)
6= 1 8j 2 NT t

:
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a type of the agent is assumed to be in a status quo. If the agent is classied to be NA he will
be NA also after innite amount of periods. Same holds for PN and SA. More importantly, they
do not have any possibilities to learn about their past behaviour. However, when time elapses
agents current information changes if he has any kind of recall, and hence agents possibilities of
understanding that he has future SCPs should be improved.45 So, it is completely possible that the
agent learns about his preferences and thus about his SCP.46 In our analysis LN represents this
kind of learning type of the agent.
We say that the agent is LN if he is like NA in the rst period but in subsequent periods
he becomes more and more aware about future SCPs true magnitude. Before giving an exact
formal denition we describe the properties of LN. We consider LN is naive in the sense that in
the rst period he is not aware of future SCPs, thus (1)(1+j) = 1 8j 2 NT 1. This assumption can
be motivated, for example, with the following reasoning. In the rst period the agent does not
have any past plans which could provide him information about his intertemporal preferences in
di¤erent periods. Hence, the agent considers that his preferences will be the same in the future
as they are in the rst period. We consider LN is learning in the sense that in the second period
self(2) understands that his intertemporal preferences di¤er from the preferences he thought in the
previous period to have in the current period. Hence, he learns he has SCP. To estimate the size of
future SCPs we assume that LN uses the simple rule (t)(t+j) =
t+
(t 1)
(t)
2 , where t is the real  in
period t and (t 1)(t) is the agents estimate in the previous period for the current periods .
47 It
is easy to check that LN is always over-optimistic about his future behaviour, i.e.  < (t)(t+j)  1
for all t 2 NT t, and thus he considers that his SCP will be smaller in the future than what it
is at the present moment. However, due to LNs backward-looking behaviour his estimates get
closer and closer to the true . Finally, if T is large enough, i.e. if there are enough periods
to attain high convergence towards , LNs perceptions about (t+j) are almost the same with
SAs perceptions that are the perfect ones. Putting it loosely, LNs perceptions about his future
preferences develop from NAs to almost SAs perceptions during his life time. This is due to his
capability of learning, which is characterised with perceptions that satises (1)(1+j) = 1 8j 2 NT 1
and  < (t+1)(t+j+1) < 
(t)
(t+j) < 1 8t; j 2 NT 22 :
To this end, we can express our formal denition of di¤erent types of the agent.
Denition 6 Let (t)(t+j) denote self(t)s perceptions about t+j, and let the true state be such that
t+j = t =  < 18t 2 NT and 8 j 2 NT t. Then
a) The agent is Naive i¤ (t)(t+j) = 1 8t 2 NT 2;8j 2 NT t;
b) The agent is Learning naive i¤ (1)(1+j) = 1 8j 2 NT 1 and  < (t+1)(t+j+1) < (t)(t+j) < 1 8t 2
45See e.g. Miravete (2003).
46However, the fact that the agent had SCP in the preceding periods does not necessarily imply that he could
or would not think he does not have them in the future. This topic is problematic, since there is evidence in the
literature that even old people su¤er from SCPs, and on the other hand there is evidence that even animals learn
from their past behaviour, hence why people should not recall and then learn.
47Self(t) has to always know t since otherwise the agent would not know even his current intertemporal preferences.
Note also, that if self(t) used the simplest possible rule (t)
(t+j)
= t his perceptions would be perfect and he would
be immediately SA after the rst period. So, in some sense the useage of the simplest rule requires then more
sophistication than using of less simple ones. Naturally, these types of sophistication are in di¤erent dimensions and
not under contemplation in here.
40
NT 22 ;8j 2 NT t;
c) The agent is Sophisticated i¤ (t)(t+j) =  8t 2 NT 2;8j 2 NT t.
In the recent literature a terminology between rationality and irrationality with respect to a
level of sophistication is very confusing, sometimes even mixed up and erroneous. We note that
according to this literature NA in Denition (6) could be called also as the irrational agent. We
refrain using this term since choices that NA makes are all completely rational from each selfs
perspective. By respecting these manners we do not call SA as the rational agent, even though SA
has rational expectations and a perfect foresight. About LN we are still eager to remark that by
the denition the agent is LN whenever his perceptions about future develop to correct direction,
no matter how this learning is gained.
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Proposition (1)
Proof. NA Consider now NAs consumption problem. Pick an arbitrary self(t) of NA. Since
i = NA then by Denition (1) self(t) has perceptions (t)(t+j) = 1 8j 2 NT t: For any given
consumption history of self(t)s past selves, self(t) considers that his maximisation problem is given
as follows.
Max
fctt+jgT tj=0
fln ctt + 
X
=1
 ln ctt+g
s:t: ctt +
T tX
=1
 ct+t  Rst + w
P tX
=0
 :
Taking derivatives with respect to consumptions yield the following rst order conditions
ctt = 
 1ctt+1 = 
 1ctt+j ;8j 2 NT t:
Substituting ctt+j = c
t
t into the budget constraint results in the following optimal consumption for
the period t.
ctt =
Rst + w
PP t
=0 

1 + 
PT t
=1 

=
Wt
1 + 
PT t
=1 

= tWt; (13)
where t = (1 + 
PT t
=1 
 ) 1 = 1 
1 +(1 T t) : Now, t =
@ct
@Wt
, and hence t is self(t)s marginal
propensity to consume (MPC). Clearly, t is not constant in time but monotonic and increases in t.
Since (t)(t+j) = 1 8j 2 NT t; self(t) has an anticipation t+j =

1 +
PT t j
=1 

 1
for 8j 2 NT t.
Thus, self(t) forms his consumption plan for all the subsequent periods by using Eq.(13) and the
following rule from the rst order condition
ctt+j = c
t
t : (14)
Together those imply
ctt+j = tWt 8j 2 NT t:
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Since self(t) was arbitrarily chosen, Eqs.(13) and (14) characterise the consumption plan for any
self(t 2 NT ), which is in general form
CtNA = ftWt; tWt; tWt; :::; tWt| {z }
T t elements
g:
Finally, each self completes the maximisation in his turn, and hence a sequence of realised con-
sumption choices from period t onwards is given by
CtNA = fjWjgTj=t :
From Eqs.(13) and (14) one can easily derive
ctt = 
 1ct(t+1) = 
 1ct(t+j) = 
 1ct(t+j+k) ) ct(t+j) = ct(t+j+k)
c
(t+j)
t+j = 
 1c(t+j)t+j+1 = 
 1c(t+j)t+j+k ) c(t+j)t+j =  1c(t+j)t+j+k
ctt+j = c
t
t+j+k 6=  1c(t+j)t+j+k = c(t+j)t+j
) ctt+j 6= c(t+j)t+j 8t 2 NT 2 and 8j 2 NT t 1: (15)
Now, the last line implies that CtNA 6= CtNA for all t 2 NT n fT   1; Tg. The last and the second to
last periods are left out as trivial ones.
SA Consider now any (non-trivial) self(t) of SA and his consumption problem. By Denition (6)
every SAs self(t) has perceptions (t)(t+j) =  8j 2 NT t implying that every self(t) knows perfectly
future incarnations intertemporal preferences. Then, self(t) makes his consumption-saving plan
conditional on known intertemporal preferences of his future selves. That is, self(t) chooses such
consumption choice for period t that maximises his intertemporal utility given the reaction of future
selves to his current consumption choice.
To nd out the best consumption-saving choice for period t; given that future selves stick to their
optimal consumption choices, self(t) uses backwards induction and solves the Bellman equation.48
Self(t)s strategy is, thus, a mapping from the state variables to the choice variable. To obtain
an equilibrium, any self(t)s strategy has to be such that it is optimal given all other selves,
self( k 2 NT n ftg), strategies. Then clearly, the equilibrium is a xed point in a strategy space.
Take self(t)s perspective. His value function, V tt+j ; for any future period t + j; satises the
following recursion
V tt+j(Wt+j) = u(c
(t+j)
t+j ) + V
t
t+j+1(R(Wt+j   c(t+j)t+j )); (16)
where the optimal consumption c(t+j)t+j chosen by self(t+j) is a function of wealth Wt+j , and the
discount factor is ; since self(t) uses exponential discounting from period t+1 onwards. In period
t; self(t) discounts future utility with the discount factor , and hence the value function for period
t is
V tt (Wt) = u(c
t
t ) + V
t
t+1(R(Wt   ctt )):
48Our derivation of SAs behaviour follows Laibson (1997), Harris and Laibson (2001) Laibson et al. (2003).
42
Now, to nd the optimal consumption choice ctt which solves the value function above, self(t) solves
ctt = max
ctt

u(ctt) + V
t
t+1(R(Wt   ctt))
	
:
Let us then consider the explicit solution for self(t)s consumption problem. To use backwards
induction, we start from the last period. From the assumption of no bequest motive follows
T = 1, hence
sT+1 = 0) cTT = TWT =WT ) V tT (WT ) = lnWT :
Then, self(t) solves rest of the value functions recursively by using Eq.(16). Thus, for the second to
last period the value function is of the form
V tT 1(WT 1) = ln c
(T 1)
T 1 +  ln(R(WT 1   c(T 1)T 1 ))
= ln T 1WT 1 +  ln(R(WT 1   T 1WT 1))
= lnWT 1 +  ln(R(1  T 1)WT 1) + ln T 1
= (1 + ) lnWT 1 + ZT 1;
where ZT 1 = ln T 1+ ln(R(1 T 1)) is constant with respect to choice variable.49 From self(t)s
viewpoint the value functions for periods t+ j are generally of the form.
V tt+j =
0@T (t+j)X
=0

1A lnWt+j + Zt+j ;
where the periodicalconstant Zt+j is of the form
Zt+j = ln t+j +
T (t+j)X
=1
 (lnR(1  t+j)) :
Particularly, for period t the value function is
V tt (Wt) = max
ctt
8<:ln ctt + 
0@0@T (t+1)X
=0

1A ln(R(Wt   ctt)) + Zt+j
1A9=; :
Let us then solve the maximisation problem above. Taking the derivative with respect to ctt and
setting it equal to zero yields
1
ctt
  
PT t
=1 

Wt   ctt
= 0:
Solving ctt yields
ctt =
Wt
1 + 
PT t
=1 

= tWt: (17)
49The expression ZT 1 = ln T 1 +  ln(R(1   T 1)) is obviously constant, since the marginal propensity to
consume T 1, gross interest rate R, and the discount factor  are all independent of the choice variable.
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Since we chose t arbitrarily, the optimising rule (17) gives the optimal current consumption for any
self. Self(t) uses Eq.(17) to derive his optimal current consumption, and hence after solving this,
his consumption plan is complete.50 The complete consumption plan for any self(t) is then
CtSA = fjWjgTj=t =
(
Rsj + wj
PP j
=0 

1 + 
PT j
=1 

)T
j=t
: (18)
CtSA is also the path of realised consumptions, i.e. C
t
SA = C
t
SA for all t 2 NT since each self uses
Eq.(17) to solve optimal current consumption.
LN To derive LNs consumption-saving behaviour we start the analysis from self(1) of LN. We
know that for LNs self(1) holds (1)(1+j) = 1, hence his consumption plan coincides with NAs self(1).
Thus,
C1LN = C
1
NA = fc1;NA1 ; c1;NA1 ; :::; c1;NA1 g;
where the number of elements in the subsequence fc1;NA1 ; :::; c1;NA1 g is naturally T   1. Self(2)
recognises c22 6= c12 , and learns that he has SCP.51 Self(2) then estimates the size of future SCP
for periods t = 2 + j by the given rule, i.e. (2)(2+j) =
+
(1)
(1+j)
2 > : Then, consumption plan C
2
LN
is formed similarly with SA. LN behaves now exactly like SA but uses upwards biased estimates
about his future SCP. C2LN is then of the form
C2LN =
8><>:Rs2 + w
PP 2
=0 

1 + 
PT 2
=1 

;
0@Rsj + wjPP j=0 
1 + 
(2)
(j)
PT j
=1 

1AT
j=3
9>=>; :
In general, for any t, CtLN is then of the form
CtLN =
8><>:Rst + w
PP t
=0 

1 + 
PT t
=1 

;
0@Rsj + wjPP j=0 
1 + 
(t)
(j)
PT j
=1 

1AT
j=t+1
9>=>;
=

tWt;


(t)
(j)W
t
j
T
j=t+1

;
where (t)(j) denotes self(t)s perception about self(j)s MPC and W
t
j is the anticipated wealth for
period j. Since the rst element in consumption plan is always the realing consumption, the
sequence of realised consumption choices for LN will be
CtLN =
(
Rsj + wj
PP j
=0 

1 + 
PT j
=1 

)T
j=t
= fjWjgTj=t;
50We remark that self(t)s only task is to plan his current consumption, since the rest of the consumption decicions
are made by the future selves and self(t) takes them as given.
51 It is important to notice that according to the analysis of SAs behaviour, no matter how self(2) forms his
consumption plan, i.e. what (t)
(t+j)
he uses, he will always nd c22 6= c12 when self(1) has formed his plan as NA.
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for any t 2 NT .
To complete the proof we note that now CtNA = C
t
SA = C
t
LN :
B.2 Proof of Lemma (1)
Proof. Pick an arbitrary t 2 NT n fTg: Rewrite the claim by using ct = tWt; ct+1 = t+1Wt+1;
then show that
tWt   t+1Wt+1 > 0;
which is equivalent with showing
tWt   t+1WtR(1  t) > 0:
Solving t gives inequality
t >
Rt+1
1 +Rt+1
: (19)
Contemplate then r.h.s of reproduced claim (19) and denote Rt+11+Rt+1  H: Then, elaborating H
results in
H =
1
1
Rt+1
+ 1
=
1
R 1(t+1) 1 + 1
(R 1=)
=
1
(1 + 
PT t 1
=1 
 ) + 1
(R 1=)
=
1
(1 + 
PT t 1
=1 
 ) + 1
=
1
( + ) +

1 + 
PT t
=1 


Now, we have
t =
1
1 + 
PT t
=1 

 > 1
( + ) +

1 + 
PT t
=1 

 = H;
which completes the proof since t was arbitrarily chosen.
B.3 Proof of Lemma (2)
Proof. (i)-(ii) Follows directly from Proposition (1).
iii) Consider now any t < P and the consumption plans CtNA and C
(t+1)
NA . Since C
t
NA 6= CtNA and
particularly ctt+1 < ct+1, we know that W
t
t+j+1 > Wt+j+1; where W
t
t+j denotes self(t)s perception
about wealth in the future period t+ j: Consider then the given selvesplanned retirement savings
stP+1 and s
(t+1)
P+1 : By using Eq.(14) we get
stP+1 =W
t
P   ctt
(ctt+1<ct+1)
> W tP   c(t+1)t+1
(W tP >W
(t+1)
P )
> W
(t+1)
P   c(t+1)t+1 = s(t+1)P+1 ;
and hence for i = NA and for all t < P it holds that stP+1 > s
(t+1)
P+1 : Thus, NAs planned retirement
savings decreases in time and coincides with the actual retirement savings only in period P . From
CtSA = C
t
SA8t 2 NT it trivially follows for SA that stP+1 = sP+1 holds for all t 2 NP :52 For LN it
52Of course also stP+1+j = sP+1+j for any t and for any j 2 NT P 1.
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is easy to verify stP+1 > s
(t+1)
P+1 > sP+1 since c
t
t+1 < c
(t+1)
t+1 directly implies W
t
P > W
(t+1)
P .
iv) First, note that st;NAP+1  st;LNP+1 = st;NAP+1   st;LNP+1 and rewrite then the claim as st;NAP+1  
st;LNP+1  0 8t  P: Pick an arbitrary self(t) for LN and NA. Write planned retirement savings in
the following present value form
st;iP+1 = Rst +
P tX
=0
(w   ct;it+ ) for i 2 fNA;LNg: (20)
Elaborate Eq.(20) as
st;iP+1 = Rst + w
P tX
=0
  
P tX
=0
ct;it+
 ;
and then reproduce the claim as
st;NAP+1   st;LNP+1 =
P tX
=0
ct;LNt+ 
  
P tX
=0
ct;NAt+ 
  0:
Then, write the LHS of the claim in the explicit form by using ct;NAt+j = ct and c
t;LN
t+j = 
(t)
(t+j)Wt+j ;
and t = (1 + 
PT t
=1 
 ) 1 and ct =Wtt. It results in
st;NAP+1   st;LNP+1 = ct;LNt +
P tX
=0
ct;LNt+ 
   ct;NAt (1 + 
P tX
=1
 )
= Wtt +
P tX
=0

(t)
(t+j)Wt+j
   Wtt
T P+t
: (21)
Since t < t+j for all j 2 NT t; and hence Wtt   WttT P+t is positive for all t 2 NT , it follows that
Eq.(21) is non-negative for all 8t  P:
B.4 Proof of Proposition (3)
Proof. i) Assume sk+1 > Rsk for some k < P: The assumption holds only if w   ck > 0; since
w ck+Rsk  sk+1; and thus sk+1 > Rsk , w ck > 0. By Lemma (1) ct > ct+1 for all t 2 NT 1,
hence if w   ck > 0 for some t then w   ck+j > 0 for all j 2 NP k: It is then clear that once the
agent starts positive saving, i.e. repayments or accumulation of the funds, he will never borrow
again.
ii) Assume t = minfk  P jsk+1  Rsk g exists: Since now k = t is the earliest period for which
sk+1  Rsk; i.e. w ck  0; it must be the case that sn+1 < Rsn for all n 2 Nt 1: Now, sn+1 < Rsn
only if w cn < 0; and since sn+1 < Rsn for all n 2 Nt 1 it follows that w cn < 0 for all n 2 Nt 1:
The agent does not have initial savings, hence we have Rs1 = 0. Then, given that sn+1 < Rsn for
all n 2 Nt 1 we have Rsn < 0 for all n 2 Nt 12 ; and thus Rsn  0 for all n 2 Nt 1 which concludes
the proof.
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B.5 Proof of Lemma (2)
Proof. For an attractive SP for self(t) assume k = pt 2 NPt+1: Then e >

W
Bt
t
W
Bk
t
  1t
1 k t
and
k = min
(
arg max
p2NPt+1
n
U^t
 
CBp
  U^t  CBt+ u (e) (1  p t)Ut(CBp)  Ut(CBt) > 0o) :
Now, gain from procrastination, i.e. u (e) (1   p t); increases and is concave in p: Loss from
procrastination is U^t
 
CBp
  U^t  CBt and can be written in the explicit form of  1t lnWBptWBtt

;
which is concave and decreasing in p: Hence, as a sum of two concave functions Upt  U^t
 
CBp
 
U^t
 
CBt

+u (e) (1 p t) must be concave as well. So, it can be ever increasing, ever decreasing
or rst increasing and then decreasing in p. Since pt 6= t ever decreasing is cancelled out as a
probable form of Upt here. If p
t = P it is clear that Upt is ever increasing and condition
e >

W
Bt
t
WBnt
  1t
1 n t
holds for all n 2 Nkt+1: If pt 6= P it must be that pt is the last p for which
Upt is increasing since p
t, by its denition, is the period for which Upt is maximised. But then
we must have Upt is increasing for all n < p as well, which completes the proof.
B.6 Proof of Lemma (3)
Proof. Pick any self(t), t 2 NP 2: Self(t) of ED has intertemporal preferences of the form
UEDt =
T tX
=0
 ln (c+t+1)  ln (e) ;
which implies plan ct = ct+8 2 NT t 1; and hence for any given Wt the optimal consumption
is ctt+1 = "t+1Wt+1;where "t+1 =
1PT t 1
=0 
 : Now, c
t+1
t+1 = "t+1Wt+1 = "tWt = c
t
t+1 since c
t+1
t+1 =
"t+1Wt+1 = "t+1RWt (1  "t) = "t+1RWt
PT t
=0 
 1PT t
=0 


= "t+1RWt
PT t
=1 
PT t
=0 


= "t+1Wt
PT t 1
=0 
PT t
=0 


=
Wt
 PT t
=0 

 1
=Wt"t:
Assume then that SP is attractive for self(t) but he wants to procrastinate for one period. We
know that self(t) has temptation to procrastinates i¤
Ut

CW
Bt
t

=
T tX
=0
 ln

"tW
Bt
t

  ln (e) <
T tX
=0
 ln

"tW
Bt+1
t

   ln (e) = Ut

CW
Bt+1
t

)
T tX
=0
 ln
 
WBtt
W
Bt+1
t
!
< (1  ) ln (e) :
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Self(t+1) will then start SP if it is not protable to procrastinate it, i.e. i¤
Ut+1

CW
Bt+1
t+1

=
T t 1X
=0
 ln

"t+1W
Bt+1
t+1

  ln (e) 
T t 1X
=0
 ln

"t+1W
Bt+2
t+1

   ln (e)
= U tt+1

CW
Bt+2
t+1

)
T t 1X
=0
 ln
 
W
Bt+1
t+1
W
Bt+2
t+1
!
 (1  ) ln (e) :
But then this implies
PT t 1
=0 
 ln

W
Bt+1
t+1
W
Bt+2
t+1

>
PT t
=0 
 ln

W
Bt
t
W
Bt+1
t

and to get a contradiction
it is enough to show ln

W
Bt+1
t+1
W
Bt+2
t+1

 ln

W
Bt
t
W
Bt+1
t

; i.e.that ln

W
Bt
t
W
Bt+1
t

is decreasing in t: Let us
assume that Wt > 1 8t 2 NP : Then analogously with the proof of Lemma (??) it is enough to show
that WBtt  WBt+1t is decreasing in t: Now,
WBtt  WBt+1t = Rst +
P tX
=0
 (w   ) + P+1 t
P+1 tX
=1
RB
 
 
Rst +
P tX
=0
 (w   ) +  + P+1 t
P tX
=1
RB
!
= 
 
P+1 t
P+1 tX
=1
RB  
P tX
=0

!
  
 
P+1 t
P tX
=1
RB  
P tX
=1

!
= 

P+1 tRP+1 tB   1

= 

(RB)
P+1 t   1

:
Clearly, (RB)
P+1 t   1 is decreasing in t since P + 1  t is decreasing in t. Hence, ln

W
Bt
t
W
Bt+1
t

is
decreasing in t and we have a contradiction, which completes the proo·f.
B.7 Proof of Lemma (4)
Proof. Let us show that such utility cost u(e) exists for which Eq.(??) holds simultaneously with
Eq.(??). By noting 1  > 1  we nd that if U^(t+1)(CBt+1)  U^(t+1)(CBt+2)  U^ tt+1(CBt+1) 
U^ tt+1(C
Bt+2) holds, then that is a su¢ cient condition to prove our claim. Starting from the right
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hand side we can elaborate its parts as follows
U^ tt+1(C
Bt+1) =
T t 1X
=0
 ln(tW
Bt+1
t+1 ) = ln(tW
Bt+1
t+1 )
T t 1X
=0
 ;
U^ tt+1(C
Bt+2) =
T t 1X
=0
 ln(tW
Bt+2
t+1 ) = ln(tW
Bt+2
t+1 )
T t 1X
=0
 ;
) U^ tt+1(CBt+1)  U^ tt+1(CBt+2) = ln
 
W
Bt+1
t+1
W
Bt+2
t+1
!
T t 1X
=0
 : (22)
Similar elaboration for the left hand side produces
U^(t+1)(CBt+1) = ln(t+1W
Bt+1
t+1 ) + 
T t 1X
=1
 ln(t+1W
Bt+1
t+1 );
U^(t+1)(CBt+2) = ln(t+1W
Bt+2
t+1 ) + 
T t 1X
=1
 ln(t+1W
Bt+2
t+1 );
) U^(t+1)(CBt+1)  U^(t+1)(CBt+2) = ln
 
W
Bt+1
t+1
W
Bt+2
t+1
!
+  ln
 
W
Bt+1
t+1
W
Bt+2
t+1
!
T t 1X
=1
 : (23)
Then, subtracting the R.H.S. of Eq (22) from the R.H.S. of Eq (23) results in 
(1  )
T t 1X
=1

!
ln
 
W
Bt+1
t+1
W
Bt+2
t+1
!
> 0;
since 1   > 0 and WBtt > WBt+it 8t; i 2 f1; 2; :::; P   tg:
B.8 Proof of Lemma (5)
Proof. Assume Wt  e 8t 2 NP and the revised set up: Pick an arbitrary self(t) such that t 2 NP :
Then, SP Bt is attractive for self(t) i¤
Ut(C) < Ut(CBt) = U^t(CBt)  u(e)
, ln(tWt) + 
T tX
=1
 ln(tWt) > ln(tW
Bt
t ) + 
T tX
=1
t ln(tW
Bt
t )  ln(e)
, ln(e) <
 
1 + 
T tX
=1

!
ln
 
WBtt
Wt
!
=  1t ln
 
WBtt
Wt
!
, e <
 
WBtt
Wt
! 1t
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Now, it is enough to show that  1t ln

W
Bt
t
Wt

is decreasing in t. Clearly  1t is decreasing in t, and
hence if then also ln

W
Bt
t
Wt

is decreasing in t we are done. To show that ln

W
Bt
t
Wt

is decreasing in
t we have to show that W
Bt
t
Wt
is decreasing in t. Since Wt  e and thus ln (Wt)  ln (e), we clearly
haveWt  1 due to construction of the revised set up and especially by the assumption of u (e) > 0:
Hence, we know that WBtt > Wt  1 8t 2 NP , from which it then follows that now 8t 2 NP holds
ln(WBtt )  ln(Wt)  WBt  Wt by the concavity of the logarithmic function: Hence, if WBtt  Wt
is decreasing in t then necessarily ln(WBtt )  ln(Wt) = ln W
Bt
t
Wt
is decreasing in t, which in its part
implies that W
Bt
t
Wt
is decreasing in t. Now,
t  WBtt  Wt = Rst +
P tX
=0
 (w   ) + P+1 t
P+1 tX
=1
RB  
 
Rst +
P tX
=0
w
!
= 
 
P+1 t
P+1 tX
=1
RB  
P tX
=0

!
) t+1 = 
 
P t
P tX
=1
RB  
P t 1X
=0

!
:
Hence, we get
t  t+1 = 
 
P+1 t
P+1 tX
=1
RB  
P tX
=0

!
  
 
P t
P tX
=1
RB  
P t 1X
=0

!
= 
 
P+1 t
P+1 tX
=1
RB   P t
P tX
=1
RB   P t
!
= 
 
P t
 

P+1 tX
=1
RB  
P tX
=1
RB
!
  P t
!
= P t
 

P+1 tX
=1
RB  
P tX
=1
RB   1
!
) t  t+1  0; i.e. WBt  Wt is decreasing,
, 
P+1 tX
=1
RB  
P tX
=1
RB   1  0
,   1 +
PP t
=1 R

BPP+1 t
=1 R

B
=
1 +
PP+1 t
=1 R

B  RP+1 tBPP+1 t
=1 R

B
= 1 +
1 RP+1 tBPP+1 t
=1 R

B
= 1 +
1 RP+1 tB
RB
1 RP+1 tB
1 RB
= 1 +
1 RB
RB
=
1
RB
;
which holds given the revised set up since by denition r < rB ; and hence   11+r > 11+rB  1RB
for all given s and RBs.
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B.9 Proof of Proposition (4)
Proof. Assume that SP has not been started, and that it is still attractive for self(t), i.e.

WBt
Wt
 1t
> e:
By Lemma (??) we know that

WB1
W1
 11
>

WBt
Wt
 1t
> e;
i.e. SP is certainly attractive for self(1) as well.
The optimal starting period is given by
pt  min
(
arg max
p2NPt+1
n
U^t
 
CBp
  U^t  CBt+ u (e) (1  p t)Ut(CBp)  Ut(CBt)  0o)
where U^t
 
CBp
   U^t  CBt can be interpreted as total loss and u (e) (1   p t) as total gain
from procrastination. Procrastination is worthwhile from self(t)s viewpoint if
U^t
 
CBp
  U^t  CBt+ u (e) (1  p t) =  1t ln
 
W
Bp
t
WBtt
!
+ (1  p t) ln (e) > 0:
By Lemma (2) we know that procrastination is tempting if it is tempting for one period, i.e. if
 1t
(1 ) ln

W
Bt
t
W
Bt+1
t

< ln (e) : Hence, procrastination is tempting for self(t) if
 1t ln
 
W
Bt+1
t
WBtt
!
+ (1  ) ln (e) > 0
,  1t ln
 
WBtt
W
Bt+1
t
!
< (1  ) ln (e) : (24)
Now, if Wt  e > 1 for all t 2 NP
ln
 
WBtt
W
Bt+1
t
!
= ln

WBtt

  ln

W
Bt+1
t

<

WBtt  WBt+1t

= 

(RB)
P+1 t   1

:
Clearly, RHS of the inequality is decreasing in t, which implies LHS of it is decreasing in t: Since  1t
is decreasing in t,  1t ln

W
Bt
t
W
Bt+1
t

is certainly decreasing in t; and hence it follows that if condition
(24) holds for self(1) it holds for every subsequent self too. This, from its part, means that if self(1)
does not start SP theres no self who would start SP while at least one period is procrastinated
since self(1) procrastinates his starting of SP.
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B.10 Proof of Lemma (6)
Proof. We have to show thatASA1 = ANA1 : To show this we rst show thatWBtt+1 = R

WBtt   tWBtt

:
If the savings program is started in the period t the wealth in the next period will clearly be
WBtt+1 = R

Wt      tWBtt

+ 
 
P t
P+1 tX
=1
RB  
P t 1X
=0

!
; (25)
where
Wt = Rst + w
P tX
=0
 ; and
WBtt = Rst + (w   )
P tX
=0
+P+1 t
P+1 tX
=1
RB =Wt + 
 
P+1 t
P+1 tX
=1
RB  
P tX
=0

!
by the construction of the revised set up. Simple elaboration of Eq.(25) results in
WBtt+1 = R

Wt      tWBtt

+ 
 
P t
P+1 tX
=1
RB  
P t 1X
=0

!
= R
 
Wt      tWBtt + P+1 t
P+1 tX
=1
RB   
P t 1X
=0

!
= R
 
Wt   tWBtt + P+1 t
P+1 tX
=1
RB   
P tX
=0

!
= R
0BBBBB@Wt + 
 
P+1 t
P+1 tX
=1
RB  
P tX
=0

!
| {z }
W
Bt
t
  tWBtt
1CCCCCA
= R

WBtt   tWBtt

) WBtt+1 = R

WBtt   tWBtt

: (26)
Now,
ASA1 =
WB11
W1
T tY
=1
 
WB1+1
W+1
!
: (27)
By using Eq.(26) we get
WB12
W2
=
R

WB11   1WB11

R (W1   1W1) =
RWB11 (1  1)
RW1 (1  1) =
WB11
W1
(28)
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Reapplying Eq.(26) with Eq.(28) we get
WB11
W1
=
WB11+
W1+
for all  2 NT 1:
Plugging this solution in to the attractiveness condition (27) yields
ASA1 =
WB11
W1
T tY
=1
 
WB11
W1
!
=
 
WB11
W1
!1+PT t=1 
=
 
WB11
W1
! 1t
= ANA1
) ASA1 = ANA1 ,
which completes the proof.
B.11 Proof of Lemma (7)
Proof. Assume that SP is attractive for self(t) of SA. If t = P it is trivial that self(t) starts
the attractive SP immediately. Hence, suppose that t < P: Now, self(t) prefers starting of the
attractive SP immediately to never starting it. If he uses the manipulative consumption in the
case where it results in ASAt+1  e; self(t) knows this and hence prefers not to use the manipulative
consumption, since using it would cause self(t+1) to abandon SP for good. If self(t) prefers not to
use the manipulative consumption it must be the case that he does not procrastinate but starts SP
immediately.
B.12 Proof of Proposition (5)
Proof. i) Assume that there exists self(k), k 2 Nptolkt+1; who starts the savings program if self(t)
procrastinates. Assume then that self(t) prefers immediate starting of SP to delaying starting of SP,
i.e. procrastination is intolerable for self(t). Then it must be the case that U (Cmct ) Ut

CW
Bt

<
0 for all pt 2 NPt+1; but then there can not exist self(k), k 2 Np
tol
t
t+1: Contradiction.
ii) Point (i) and Lemma (7).
B.13 Proof of Corollary (2)
Proof. i) Assume the revised set up, i = SA, let e < ASAt ; and suppose that SP is non-started. By
the analogy between NAs and SAs choices when the attractive SP is not started we know that if
e < ASAt then e < ASA1 : If SP is attractive for self(1) of SA then by Proposition (5) he either starts
it immediately or then if he procrastinates it will be started in period k 2 Nptol12 :
ii) Suppose not,i.e. suppose that the retirement savings are greater in the absence than in the
presence of SP. Then, from self(1)s perspective the discounted utility from the retirement time,
 2 NTP+1; must be higher in the absence than in the presence of SP. Now, for any wealth level
posted for the retirement, WRetP+1 the optimal consumption during the retirement time is given
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by the xed sequence of MPCs multiplied by the relevant periodical wealth, i.e consumption is
given by

W
Ret

	T
=P+1
: This sequence produces higher utility only if WRetP+1 > W
Ret,Bp
P+1 : But
then, use of xed MPCs also for working periods;  2 NP ; results in sequences WRet 	P=1
and
n
W
Ret,Bp

oP
=1
, where WRet > W
Ret,Bp
 for all  2 NP . Particularly, now WRet1 >
W
Ret,Bp
1 ; which is a contradiction, since by the claim (i) the savings program is attractive for
self(1). Recall, ln (e) > 0 ) e > 1; and SP is attractive for self(1) i¤ A1 > e which is equivalent
with ln

W
Bp
1
W1
 11
> ln (e) : Thus, for the attractiveness for self(1) must hold W
Bp
1 > W1 since
 1 > 1 for all  2 NT 1:
B.14 Proof of Proposition (6)
Proof. (i)-(ii) Analogy with the behaviour of NAs self(1), Proposition (4), and Eqs.(11) and (12).
(iii) Let At > e and t  3: Then, given self(t)s perception about future behaviour, he starts SP i¤
there does not exist self(k) ; k 2 Nptoltt+1; and otherwise procrastinates. For the rst case, suppose that
dened self(k) does not exists. Then, after procrastination of t   1 periods, self(t) starts SP and
hence by point (ii) in Corollary (2) retirement savings are greater in the presence than in the absence
of SP. For the other case, suppose that dened self(k) ; k 2 Np
tol
t 1
t ; does exists for self(t  1), and note
that the existence is based on self(t  1)s perception about future behaviour. In addition and with
out loss of generality, suppose that t 1WBtt 1 ) ALNt  e, i.e. suppose that self(t  1) is the last self
for whom SP is attractive and hence use of the manipulative consumption leads abandoning of SP
in the subsequent period. Now, self(t  1) procrastinates and self(t) abandons SP for good; thus,
SP has been procrastinated t   1 periods and due to use of manipulative consumption retirement
savings will be lower in the presence than in the absence of SP.
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